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CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND 
COASTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A 
MASSACHUSETTS CASE STUDY 
Lara D. Guercio* 
Abstract: This Article examines how existing state laws, including coastal 
property law and public trust doctrines, are likely to create challenges for 
the implementation of adaptation strategies proposed to address the ef-
fects of climate change—specifically, accelerated sea level rise, increased 
coastal flooding and storm-related erosion—on coastlines and connected 
natural resource areas, such as beaches, coastal wetlands, and tidelands. 
The Article uses Massachusetts, with its highly evolved body of coastal 
property law and public trust doctrine, as a case study. Mindful of U.S. 
Supreme Court takings doctrine, the Article analyzes the likely legal chal-
lenges to climate change adaptation strategies recently proposed for Mas-
sachusetts’s coastal zone, and concludes with some preliminary sugges-
tions to balance private property rights with the emerging public policy 
imperative for climate change adaptation. 
Introduction 
 The intersection of climate change, its effects—including acceler-
ated sea level rise (“SLR”) on coastal areas and shorelines—and the Su-
preme Court’s takings jurisprudence likely will throw into heightened 
relief traditional state-based littoral property rights. These rights include 
common law property interests associated with accretion, reliction, and 
avulsion.1 U.S. coastal property law is further complicated by deeply-
rooted, state-specific public trust doctrines, which in their broadest 
terms reserve public rights of use and access along traditionally defined 
 
* Lara DuMond Guercio is an associate at the Boston law firm of Goulston & Storrs. 
She received her J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School in 2008, an LL.M. in 
Environmental Law from Vermont Law School in 2010, and her undergraduate degree in 
Environmental Studies from Middlebury College. The author thanks Peter Corbett and 
Matthew Kiefer, directors at Goulston & Storrs, for their encouragement, seasoned insight, 
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formational purposes only, and you are urged to consult your own lawyer concerning your 
specific situation and any legal questions you may have. 
1 See infra notes 7–10, 357–370 and accompanying text. 
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coastlines.2 Both common law rights and state statutes incorporating 
these legal principles, however, were judicially crafted and legislatively 
enacted at a time when the existence and effects of climate change on 
coastal development could not have been anticipated.3 
 To date, neither Massachusetts statutes nor case law have specifi-
cally addressed if the Commonwealth’s public trust doctrine will mi-
grate landward when SLR accelerates over historic baselines.4 Massa-
chusetts’s public trust doctrine provides use-specific public access for 
fishing, fowling, and navigation on and over “Private Tidelands” located 
above the historic low water mark.5 Scientists anticipate sea levels will 
rise due to the effects of climate change—scientifically documented to 
be caused primarily by anthropogenic activities, namely human use of 
fossil fuels.6 It is also unclear what legal significance shifts in coastlines, 
as accelerated by effects of climate change, will have on the location of 
existing property boundaries. Further, the question remains whether 
existing legal doctrines of accretion7 and reliction,8 or avulsion9 should 
apply to SLR.10 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1988) (quoting Shive-
ly v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)). 
3 See id. (explaining that the public trust doctrine derives from English common law); 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report, Summary for Policymakers 2 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf (explaining that climate change is a recent 
phenomenon). 
4 See James G. Titus, Climate Ready Estuaries, Rolling Easements 47 (2001); 
Heather J. Wilson, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 839, 853–59 (1984) (discussing application of Massachusetts public 
trust doctrine to the coastline without considering SLR). 
5 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02 (2012). 
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 5–6; U.S. Cli-
mate Change Sci. Program, Coastal Sensitivity to Sea Level Rise: A Focus on the 
Mid-Atlantic Region 41–42 (2009). 
7 Accretion is “the increase of land by the action of natural forces” and applies to the 
gradual and imperceptible enlargement of riparian or littoral lands by coastal processes 
such as currents and tides. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 8 (10th ed. 
2001). 
8 Reliction is “the gradual recession of water leaving land permanently uncovered” and 
applies to erosion of these same lands. See id. at 885. 
9 Avulsion is “a sudden cutting off of land by flood, currents, or change in course of a 
body of water,” which includes events that cause sudden and perceptible change in land. 
See id. at 80. 
10 See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 305, 306 & n.2 (2010) (describing the tensions between accretion and avul-
sion in property law). Further, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has only his-
torically applied the doctrine of avulsion to determine the location of riparian property 
rights and boundaries, but not to date in the context of littoral coastal property rights. See 
infra notes 382–384 and accompanying text. 
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 Even in the absence of observed and widely predicted climate 
change, Massachusetts’s varied fifteen thousand-mile coastline exists as 
a dynamic equilibrium between land and sea—shaped by the natural 
forces of wind and waves and human land uses, activities, and develop-
ment.11 Coastlines naturally shift and adjust to relative shoreline shape, 
availability of sediment, increases in wind and wave energy, and histori-
cally slowly rising sea levels.12 The effects of climate change under all 
current climate modeling scenarios will accelerate changes in the al-
ready dynamic character of the Massachusetts coastline13 and threaten 
coastal and estuarine resource areas, including beaches, dunes, salt 
marshes, and tidal flats.14 These areas not only serve as habitat and 
breeding grounds for fish and wildlife, but also support traditional hu-
man activities of fishing, fowling, and navigation protected by the 
Commonwealth’s public trust doctrine.15 Coastal areas, particularly 
beaches, are also popular venues for a range of recreational activities. 
Many coastal features, such as dunes, barrier islands, and wetlands, 
help attenuate coastal flooding and serve as natural buffers between 
the sea and adjacent private development, public infrastructure, and 
inland communities.16 Finally, Massachusetts’s coastline continues to be 
a desirable location for private residential development, and a neces-
                                                                                                                      
11 See Coastal Hazards Comm’n, Preparing for the Storm: Recommendations for 
Management of Risk from Coastal Hazards in Massachusetts 1 (2007); Ken Kimmell 
& Laurie Burt, Massachusetts Takes on Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 295, 306 
(2009). 
12 Coastal Hazards Comm’n, supra note 11. 
13 Id. at 3. The Coastal Hazards Commission report states that records of tide gauges 
around Boston, Woods Hole, and Nantucket indicate that, over the past one hundred years, 
relative sea level—a “combination of rising water surface with land subsidence” —has risen 
approximately ten inches. Id. Further, the International Panel on Climate Change “predicts 
that SLR and its risk to coastal resources will accelerate over the next 100 years.” Id. The report 
indicates that under conservative projection, by 2100, sea levels could rise anywhere from four 
to twenty-one inches, whereas under less conservative scenarios, SLR would range from eight 
to thirty-three inches. Id.; see also Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs (“EEA”) & Ad-
aptation Advisory Comm., Massachusetts Climate Change Adaptation Report 15–17 
(2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/cca/eea-climate-adaptation- 
report.pdf (discussing more current SLR modeling and projections). 
14 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 17, 44, 115. 
15 See id. at 34; James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to 
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1279, 1363 (1998) 
(quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76–77 (1821)). 
16 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 108. 
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sary location for both commercial and recreational water-dependent 
activities and uses tied to navigation.17 
 The frequency and intensity of legal challenges over the highly 
sensitive balance between private and public coastal property rights will 
likely increase as climate change accelerates changes in coastlines.18 As 
coastlines begin to shift more rapidly, coastal property owners likely will 
find it necessary to consider whether to resist, increase their resilience 
to, or ultimately retreat from the encroaching sea.19 Affected parties in 
Massachusetts will include private individuals and entities, the Com-
monwealth, the City of Boston, and other coastal municipalities.20 Pri-
vate landowners and state and local governments must plan for— in-
stead of merely react to—the reasonably anticipated effects of climate 
change.21 
 Recent federal and state cases illustrate some of the legal claims 
likely to be raised by landowners faced with more frequent and abrupt 
physical changes in coastlines along or near their properties. For in-
stance, in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, a case chal-
lenging Florida’s Beach and Shoreline Preservation Act.22 The Court 
found that the implementation of state-approved beach renourishment 
projects did not contravene the established property rights of the plain-
tiff’s members.23 Thus, the Court held that Florida had not taken pri-
vate property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.24 Additionally, pri-
vate property owners likely will challenge the constitutionality of state 
and local laws restricting coastal development and those requiring the 
conservation of undeveloped uplands to accommodate the landward 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Paul Kirshen et al., Climate Change and Coastal Flooding in Metro Bos-
ton: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies 454 (2008) [hereinafter Kirshen et al., 
Coastal Flooding]. 
18 See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory Tak-
ings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 625, 626 (2010). 
19 See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 281. 
20 See Paul H. Kirshen et al., Climate’s Long-term Impacts on Metro Boston 
(CLIMB): Media Summary 3 (2006) [hereinafter Kirshen et al., CLIMB]. 
21 Paul Kirshen et al., Climate Change in Metropolitan Boston, 20 New Eng. J. Pub. Pol’y 
89, 97 (2005). 
22 Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011–.242 (2012); 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2599–600 (2010). 
23 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2612 (2010). 
24 Id. at 2613. 
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migration of coastal natural areas and associated fish and wildlife habi-
tat due to SLR.25 
 In Massachusetts, the societal need for new legislation, including 
amendments to the Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act of 1866 
(“Chapter 91”), will likely become increasingly evident over time.26 
Such amendments would democratically rebalance valuable public and 
private coastal property rights and associated interests with specific con-
sideration for the broad international scientific consensus on climate 
change and its effects, including accelerated SLR.27 Additionally, state 
regulations and policies developed to implement the Commonwealth’s 
recent environmental legislation, including the Global Warming Solu-
tions Act of 2008, should be used to proactively plan for and help man-
age the likely effects of climate change, while respecting existing pri-
vate coastal property interests and affected landowners’ reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations in the continued and future use of val-
uable coastal real estate.28 
 This Article reviews the existing “background principles” of Massa-
chusetts law that relate to coastal property rights and its public trust doc-
trine.29 Based on this review, it is increasingly clear that property owners’ 
and the Commonwealth’s attempts to adapt to the effects of climate 
change, including SLR, will likely strain the long-standing common law 
principles incorporated into state property law by historical judicial 
precedent and existing statutes.30 Over time, as the effects of climate 
change become more frequently experienced, application of these exist-
ing principles of law may become so stressed by shifting environmental 
conditions that they can no longer serve the equitable considerations 
that they were originally created to address.31 
 This Article examines how existing state laws are likely to create 
challenges for the implementation of adaptation strategies proposed to 
address the effects of climate change and uses Massachusetts as a case 
study. Part I explores the effects of climate change on coastline envi-
ronments, including the Massachusetts coast.32 Part II reviews adapta-
tion strategies for coastal communities to respond to changing coast-
                                                                                                                      
25 Byrne, supra note 18. 
26 See infra notes 174–206 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 338–352 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 298–304 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 147–231 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 316–394 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 380–392 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 36–92 and accompanying text. 
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lines.33 Part III provides an overview of Massachusetts statutes and regu-
lations regarding rights of the public and private owners along the 
coast.34 Part IV then provides an analysis to potential legal challenges to 
adaptation strategies by reviewing current Takings Clause jurispru-
dence.35 This Article concludes with preliminary suggestions to balance 
private property rights with the emerging public policy imperative for 
climate change adaptation. 
I. Climate Change and Likely Effects on Coastlines 
 In recent years, consensus has solidified within the United States 
and international scientific communities that the planet has entered a 
period of predominately human-influenced global warming and climate 
change.36 Specifically, leading climate scientists agree that “[w]arming 
of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations 
of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.”37 Further, 
scientists have found that the global warming and climate change “ob-
served over the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced emis-
sions of heat-trapping gases . . . . mainly from the burning of fossil fuels 
(coal, oil, and gas), with important contributions from the clearing of 
forests, agricultural practices, and other activities.”38 The observed and 
predicted effects of climate change on coastlines include 1) accelerated 
relative or localized SLR; 2) increased frequency and severity of damag-
ing storm surges and associated coastal flooding; 3) amplified storm-
related shoreline erosion; and 4) the permanent inundation of low-lying 
coastal areas, including floodplains and coastal wetlands.39 
                                                                                                                      
33 See infra notes 93–146 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 147–247 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 248–394 and accompanying text. 
36 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 12. 
37 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
38 U.S. Global Change Research Program, Global Climate Change Impacts in 
the United States 9 (2009). 
39 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 16–17; see Peter C. Frum-
hoff et al., Confronting Climate Change in the U.S. Northeast: Science, Impacts, 
and Solutions 15 (2007). 
2013] Climate Change Adaptation and Coastal Property Rights 355 
A. Effects on the Coastline: Accelerated Sea Level Rise 
 Over the last century, global sea levels rose approximately eight 
inches, despite stable levels over the previous two millennia.40 Further 
“[s]atellite data available over the past 15 years show sea level rising at a 
rate roughly double the rate observed over the past century.”41 Indeed, 
records of tide gauges in Massachusetts around Boston, Woods Hole, 
and Nantucket demonstrate relative SLR of roughly ten inches over last 
century.42 As detailed in scientific assessments and reports, accelerated 
SLR results from a combination of ocean water expanding as its tem-
perature rises and the melting of glaciers and major ice sheets.43 In 
Massachusetts, localized land subsidence and shifting currents further 
amplify these factors.44 Current rates of SLR and the varied projections 
for accelerated trends over the twenty-first century present serious 
threats to the coastal communities of Massachusetts.45 
 More generally, predicting relative SLR presents challenges. Al-
though scientists can accurately model effects of thermal expansion and 
melting glaciers, the complex processes controlling the seaward move-
ments and melting of polar ice sheets are less understood and thus 
harder to model.46 Despite these present uncertainties, “[c]ontinued 
[greenhouse gas] emissions at or above current rates would cause fur-
ther warming and induce many changes in the global climate system 
during the 21st century that would very likely be larger than those ob-
served during the 20th century.”47 Due to current limits in scientific cer-
tainty of some important drivers of SLR, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 2007 Report does not address the upper 
bounds of SLR.48 
 SLR projections for the twenty-first century are evolving rapidly 
due in part to the variables and current scientific uncertainties identi-
                                                                                                                      
40 U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 38, at 18. 
41 Id. 
42 Coastal Hazards Comm’n, supra note 11, at 3. 
43 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 16; U.S. Global Change Research Program, 
supra note 38, at 18. 
44 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 15–16. 
45 Id. at 16. 
46 U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 38, at 25. 
47 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 7. 
48 Id. The IPCC’s projections for global SLR include contributions from increased 
Greenland and Antarctic ice flows at rates observed between 1993 and 2003, but do not 
include estimates for future changes in polar ice sheet flow rates. Id. at 8. 
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fied above.49 The IPCC’s projections, though conservative, are credible 
and internationally recognized.50 Based on several different green-
house gas (“GHG”) emission scenarios, the IPCC projects SLR by 2100 
could be: seven inches with low emissions; nineteen inches with mid-
level emissions; and twenty-three inches with high emissions.51 In con-
trast, another report that includes melt from land ice in its estimates 
predicts much higher global SLR under all emission scenarios: thirty-
one inches under low emissions; thirty-three inches under mid-level 
emissions; and seventy-nine inches under high emissions.52 Addition-
ally, other recent studies predict that changes in the Atlantic sea cur-
rents could cause SLR beyond the predicted global mean.53 
B. Effects on the Coastline: Increased Frequency and Extent of  
Storm-Related Coastal Flooding 
 Coastal areas become increasingly vulnerable to storms as sea levels 
rise.54 Additionally, land subsidence and changes in storminess can esca-
late the effects of storm-related coastal flooding.55 Specifically, along the 
U.S. East Coast, long-term storm climatology has not changed, but 
storm surge impacts have increased.56 SLR and other factors such as 
existing coastal development have already significantly affected many 
U.S. coastal areas.57 Current flood data indicate an increased frequency 
of flooding in low-lying regions from storm surges and spring tides.58 
                                                                                                                     
 Combined with accelerated SLR, present storm climatology and 
storm surge frequency distributions lead to “forecasts of more severe 
coastal flooding. . . . higher potential flood levels and more frequent 
 
49 See U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 38, at 25–26 (noting the 
complexity of predicting future sea level rise). 
50 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 16. 
51 Id. 
52 W. T. Pfeffer et al., Kinematic Constraints on Glacier Contributions to 21st-Century Sea-
Level Rise, 321 Sci. 1340, 1340, 1342 (2008). 
53 Aixue Hu et al., Transient Response of the MOC and Climate to Potential Melting of the 
Greenland Ice Sheet in the 21st Century, Geophysical Res. Letters, May 2009, at 1, 3–5; Jian-
jun Yin et al., Model Projections of Rapid Sea-Level Rise on the Northeast Coast of the United States, 
Nature Geoscience, Apr. 2009, at 262, 262. 
54 See Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Assessment of Observed Changes and Responses in Natural and 
Managed Systems, in Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability 79, 92–93 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007). 
55 Id. at 92. 
56 Id. 
57 See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 60; Rosenzweig et al., supra 
note 54, at 92–93. 
58 U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 60. 
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flooding at levels rarely experienced today.”59 A study of coastal flood-
ing along the northeastern United States and Massachusetts coastlines, 
using conservative SLR projections from the IPCC’s 2007 Assessment, 
shows substantial increases in the frequency and heights of today’s one 
hundred-year floods.60 The study predicts that by the middle of the 
twenty-first century, such floods will occur on average every two to three 
years in Boston.61 By 2100, Boston will experience these floods every 
year or two on average.62 Further, the study predicts increases in today’s 
one hundred-year maximum flood height in Boston by at least two ad-
ditional feet under high emission scenarios by 2100.63 Notably, SLR 
changes alone affect these projections, which do not include other po-
tential climate change-induced shifts in shoreline position, changes in 
storm frequency, intensity, or track, or the accelerated melting of polar 
ice sheets.64 
C. Effects on the Coastline: Coastal Erosion of Beaches, Banks, and Dunes 
 According to the IPCC, SLR probably contributes to coastal ero-
sion.65 Such erosion impacts the U.S. East Coast, “where 75% of the 
shoreline removed from the influence of spits, tidal inlets and engi-
neering structures is eroding.”66 Scientists already consider coastline 
erosion to be a significant problem in many parts of the Northeast.67 In 
addition to historical SLR, coastal erosion comes from other natural 
factors and physical processes such as waves, storms, sediment supply, 
human activity, and the geological character of the coast.68 
 Nationally, federal agencies predict that as sea level rises at rates 
higher than those observed over the past century, coastal erosion will 
probably increase.69 The character of coastal landforms—such as barrier 
islands and cliffs—will be important variables influencing the precise 
                                                                                                                      
59 Christopher B. Field et al., North America, in Working Group II, supra note 54, at 
617, 630. 
60 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 18. 
61 Id. at 19 (using the IPCC’s current high and low emission scenarios, respectively). 
62 Id. (using both high and low emission scenarios). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 54, at 92. 
66 Id. 
67 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 25. 
68 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 113; U.S. Climate Change 
Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 62. 
69 U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 23. 
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manner and speed at which these changes occur.70 In sandy shore envi-
ronments, however, coastal headlands, spits, and barrier islands are vir-
tually certain to erode more quickly.71 For example, Cape Cod, Massa-
chusetts, already experiences coastal erosion and beach loss.72 Further, 
the south shore of Nantucket Island, which had lost about 2600 feet of 
land total to the Atlantic Ocean in the past three hundred years, now 
loses about fifteen feet of land each year.73 
 Although strong scientific consensus exists that climate change ac-
celerates SLR and affects coastal regions, many uncertainties still com-
plicate any detailed predictions on how coastlines will respond.74 As a 
product of the complex interactions between these factors, coastal scien-
tists face difficulty in predicting how shorelines will change in response 
to SLR.75 Despite these uncertainties, coastal erosion may present sig-
nificant problems for coastal properties because the rate of erosion is 
typically much greater than the vertical rise in sea level.76 Consequently, 
the results of such erosion could be more dramatic than accelerated 
SLR alone.77 Some scientists maintain that barrier islands, wetlands, and 
other parts of coastal systems may have tipping points: when certain lim-
its or thresholds are exceeded, these coastal landforms will become un-
stable and undergo large, rapid, and largely irreversible changes.78 
D. Effects on the Coastline: Loss and Migration of Coastal Wetlands 
 In the northeastern United States, relative SLR already threatens 
coastal wetlands.79 These areas provide key ecological functions and 
services: protecting coastal areas from the effects of waves, flooding, 
and erosion; filtering pollutants and nutrients within the coastal area; 
providing nursery grounds for commercially valuable fish and shellfish; 
and serving as a home for waterfowl, migratory birds, and threatened 
and endangered wildlife.80 Historically, the Northeast’s Atlantic coast 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. 
71 Id. Importantly, the mid-Atlantic coast is entirely comprised of these sandy shore en-
vironments. Id. at 23–24. 
72 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 27. 
73 See id. 
74 U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 64. 
75 See id. 
76 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 25. 
77 See id. 
78 U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 64. 
79 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 27. 
80 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 113; Frumhoff et al., supra 
note 39, at 27–28; U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 114. 
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marshes have naturally accumulated or accreted sediment and organic 
matter sufficient to maintain their elevation.81 
 As a result of climate change, coastal wetlands, including salt 
marshes, are particularly sensitive to long-term SLR.82 As their locations 
are linked intimately to sea level, such wetlands are at risk of inunda-
tion.83 Some salt marshes in less developed areas may avoid impacts of 
SLR through sufficient vertical accretion.84 In developed coastal com-
munities, however, accelerated SLR will likely cause loss of salt marshes 
and other important coastal resource areas.85 Specifically, these areas 
likely will not be able to maintain adequate accretion rates to counter 
the effects of SLR because of a predicted reduction of sediment load.86 
In more developed areas, accelerated SLR will increase rates of wetland 
loss due in part to “coastal squeeze” —human development and local-
ized physical characteristics such as wave energy and slope—that con-
strain landward migration of wetlands.87 
 Losses of ecological functions associated with coastal wetlands will 
also have important societal consequences.88 Specifically, wetland losses 
leave developed and urbanized coastal areas more vulnerable to flood-
ing and storm-related erosion.89 Thus, more pollutants can enter and 
contaminate coastal waters, reducing the habitat quality of these highly 
productive natural areas, harming many animal species, and threaten-
ing commercially significant fish and shellfish populations.90 Scientists 
have found that it is virtually certain that tidal wetlands experiencing 
submergence will continue to lose ground to the sea in response to fu-
ture accelerated SLR and other climate changes.91 In addition, an over-
all increase in tidal wetland area in the United States over the next one 
                                                                                                                      
81 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 28. See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, su-
pra note 6, at 194–202, for a more detailed review of vertical development of coastal wet-
lands and the influence of climate change. 
82 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 44. Salt marshes are “lo-
cated between the high spring tide and mean tide levels of protected coastal shores.” Id. 
These areas provide food and habitat for important marine and terrestrial wildlife. Id. 
83 See Robert J. Nicholls et al., Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas, in Working Group 
II, supra note 54, at 328. 
84 Field et al., supra note 59. 
85 See id. 
86 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 44. 
87 Nicholls et al., supra note 83, at 329; see also U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, 
supra note 6, at 202–04 (detailing the physical factors influencing the likelihood of success-
ful horizontal migration of coastal wetlands). 
88 See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 27. 
89 Frumhoff et al., supra note 39, at 15, 28. 
90 Id. at 28. 
91 U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 208. 
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hundred years is very unlikely, given current wetland loss rates and the 
relatively few successful examples of natural development of new tidal 
wetlands.92 
II. Adaptation by Coastal Communities and in Coastal Areas 
 An extensive body of literature published internationally, nation-
ally, and locally provides guidance on ways coastal communities can 
adapt to the anticipated effects of climate change on human develop-
ment and natural resources.93 Coastal adaptation responses include 
managing coastal systems to reduce risks related to current climate ex-
tremes and variability; implementing sustainable development practices; 
and developing better models.94 As described by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”): 
Adaptation to climate change takes place through adjust-
ments to reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience in re-
sponse to observed or expected changes in climate and asso-
ciated extreme weather events. Adaptation occurs in physical, 
ecological and human systems. It involves changes in social 
and environmental processes, perceptions of climate risk, 
                                                                                                                      
92 Id. 
93 See Bos. Climate Adaptation Work Grp., Adaptation Recommendations 1–3 
(2010) (outlining elements and strategies of an adaptation plan for the city of Boston); 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 14–18 (detailing adap-
tation and mitigation options); Kirshen et al., Coastal Flooding, supra note 17, at 461–
63 (outlining adaptation scenarios for metro Boston); Nicholls et al., supra note 83, at 340–
45 (discussing adaption practice, options, and constraints); Drake Bennett, Defending Bos-
ton from the Sea, Bos. Globe, June 6, 2010, at K1 (discussing Boston’s need for adaptation 
and outlining specific strategies to protect the city from rising sea levels); Coastal Areas 
Impacts & Adaptation, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
impacts-adaptation/coasts.html#adapt (last updated Apr. 22, 2013) (providing adaptation 
examples for coastal areas). See generally Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Adapta-
tion Planning—What U.S. States and Localities Are Doing (2007) (discussing adap-
tation plans in various states and localities); Coastal States Org. Climate Change 
Work Grp., The Role of Coastal Zone Management Programs in Adaptation to 
Climate Change (2007) (discussing the role of coastal zone management programs within 
adaptation strategies); Ne. Reg’l Ocean Council, Coastal Hazards Resilience Commit-
tee: 2009–2010 Work Plan (2008) (promoting development of adaption strategies within 
the northeast United States); W. Neil Adger et al., Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options, 
Constraints and Capacity, in Working Group II, supra note 54, at 717 (discussing adaptation 
practices and options); Heinz Ctr. & Ceres, Resilient Coasts: A Blueprint for Action 
(2009) (discussing the critical need for adaptation plans and identifying adaptation princi-
ples); Climate Ready Estuaries, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://water.epa.gov/type/oceb/ 
cre/index.cfm (last updated Jan. 10, 2013) (providing resources for managers to develop 
and implement adaptation techniques). 
94 Nicholls et al., supra note 83, at 341. 
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practices and functions to reduce potential damages or to re-
alise new opportunities. Adaptations include anticipatory and 
reactive actions, private and public initiatives, and can relate 
to projected changes in temperature and current climate var-
iations and extremes that may be altered with climate change. 
In practice, adaptations tend to be on-going processes, reflect-
ing many factors or stresses, rather than discrete measures to 
address climate change specifically. . . . [As used by the IPCC], 
adaptation practices refer to actual adjustments, or changes in 
decision environments, which might ultimately enhance resil-
ience or reduce vulnerability to observed or expected changes 
in climate. Thus, investment in coastal protection infrastruc-
ture to reduce vulnerability to storm surges and anticipated 
sea-level rise is an example of actual adjustments.95 
This Part provides an overview of possible adaptation responses or op-
tions that communities may utilize.96 As coastlines and coastal resource 
areas increasingly experience the effects of climate change, coastal 
communities can better understand the dynamics of three major strat-
egies: protection and resistance, accommodation and resilience, and 
mandatory retreat and relocation.97 
 Adaptation in coastal areas will be more challenging in developing 
countries than in developed countries such as the United States because 
of social constraints, limited financial resources, and overall lack of 
adaptive capacity.98 Developed countries may have fewer obstacles, but 
these challenges are still pressing.99 The IPCC 2007 Assessment noted 
that under present climate conditions, adaptation to coastal hazards is 
often inadequate in North America.100 Further, coastal communities 
generally are not ready for increased exposure to storms.101 
 Americans are both coastal and increasingly urban. Almost forty 
percent of Americans live in counties along the coastal shoreline.102 In 
addition, roughly eighty percent of North Americans live in urban ar-
                                                                                                                      
95 Adger et al., supra note 93, at 720. 
96 See infra notes 98–146 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 113–146 and accompanying text. 
98 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 14; W. Neil 
Adger et al., supra note 93, at 719. 
99 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 14. 
100 Field et al., supra note 59, at 623. 
101 Id. 
102 National Coastal Population Report: Population Trends from 1970 to 2020, 
Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. 4 (2013). 
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eas.103 Although largely shielded from the natural environment by tech-
nology and advanced infrastructure, the devastating effects of Atlantic 
hurricanes in the early twenty-first century, such as Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, highlight the vulnerability of existing public and private infra-
structure.104 Individuals and communities are not prepared for the ef-
fects of coastal hazards, anticipated to increase in frequency.105 Based 
on the existing scientific data and climate change predictions, Massa-
chusetts faces a critical timing threshold to adequately plan for the ef-
fects of climate change-induced sea level rise (“SLR”) on the coast.106 
The Commonwealth has an opportunity to implement measures to 
successfully adapt existing private and public development, land uses, 
and infrastructure.107 
 In the Boston area, Paul Kirshen and other researchers involved in 
the Climate’s Long-term Impacts on Metro Boston (“CLIMB”) study 
have analyzed possible adaptation strategies in response to climate 
change and predicted coastal flooding.108 The CLIMB study, a multi-
disciplinary research project conducted between 1999 and 2004, as-
sessed the potential impacts of climate change on infrastructure within 
the metropolitan Boston area (“metro Boston”).109 The study recom-
mended adaptation strategies to prevent, reduce, and manage climate 
change-related risks.110 Among other reviewed areas, the CLIMB study 
analyzed how predicted accelerated SLR would likely affect metro Bos-
ton’s existing environment and infrastructure.111 The CLIMB study as-
sessed the effects of climate change and coastal flooding within metro 
Boston, stretching from the northern town of Ipswich to the southern 
town of Duxbury.112 
A. Protection and Resistance 
 Protection and resistance initiatives utilize human engineering ca-
pabilities to guard inland areas from the potentially destructive forces 
                                                                                                                      
103 Field et al., supra note 59, at 625. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 630. 
106 Kirshen et al., CLIMB, supra note 20, at 1–3. 
107 Id. at 3. 
108 Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report 5, 54 (2004) [hereinafter Kirshen et al., 
CLIMB Final Report]. 
109 Kirshen et al., Coastal Flooding, supra note 17. 
110 Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 154–62. 
111 See id. at 54–68. 
112 Id. at 54. 
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of the sea.113 Protection and resistance strategies for climate change 
and its effects on coastlines offer opportunities for communities to 
adapt to new circumstances.114 The CLIMB study specifically identified 
this as a “Build Your Way Out” scenario.115 Through increased reliance 
on and use of “hard” engineering coastal structures including seawalls, 
bulkheads, and storm surge barriers, this strategy allows for continued 
growth in floodplain areas without climate change-related land use re-
strictions.116 These areas receive protection from retrofitted or new 
coastal structures designed to withstand the accelerated SLR and in-
creased coastal flooding predicted in the twenty-first century.117 
 Such strategies have corresponding drawbacks. Namely, this ap-
proach interrupts the natural movements and replenishment of sedi-
ment to coastal resource areas, such as beaches and dunes.118 Protec-
tion measures also may create physical barriers to the horizontal, land-
ward migration of these coastal natural areas as accelerated SLR 
occurs.119 If engineered solutions inadequately protect against SLR that 
actually occurs over the twenty-first century, increased development 
density and risk within floodplains areas would be problematic.120 
 In contrast, “soft” engineering options may provide a “greener” 
alternative to adaptation via the hard engineering solutions described 
above. Soft engineering options include protection of existing natural 
barriers and resource areas via beach nourishment and dune recon-
struction.121 Advantages of soft coastal techniques include greater ecol-
ogically sensitivity, continued use of coastal resource areas by fish and 
wildlife,122 and greater likelihood of supporting the preservation of tra-
                                                                                                                      
113 U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 282–83 (“The term ‘shore 
protection’ generally refers to a class of coastal engineering activities that reduce the risk 
of flooding, erosion, or inundation of land and structures.”). 
114 See Kirshen et al., CLIMB, supra note 20, at 2. 
115 Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 80. 
116 Id. at 58; Kirshen et al., CLIMB, supra note 20, at 2; see U.S. Climate Change Sci. 
Program, supra note 6, at 282–95 (describing shore protection strategies generally). 
117 See Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 58. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 Rebecca Haney et al., Beach Nourishment: MassDEP’s Guide to Best Man-
agement Practices for Projects in Massachusetts 6 (2007); see U.S. Climate Change 
Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 290. 
122 Projects need to be implemented in consideration of existing rare species habitat. 
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ditional public access along shorelines and within both Private and 
Commonwealth Tidelands.123 
 Soft engineering options are not without corresponding draw-
backs, as well. Disadvantages of soft engineering solutions include the 
frequency of repeated beach nourishment and reconstruction mainte-
nance, which is likely to increase as SLR accelerates.124 Soft engineering 
strategies may also cause off-site environmental impacts to sediment 
source dredging locations.125 In addition, if the public does not own in 
fee simple the artificially-nourished beaches, frequent nourishment 
projects with imported sediment become a very questionable public 
investment in private property, or alternatively an increasingly expen-
sive activity for private landowners to undertake and sustain.126 
B. Accommodation and Resilience 
 Accommodation and resilience adaptation strategies have low envi-
ronmental impacts, preemptively adjusting to climate change and SLR 
effects.127 This approach can include floodplain regulations stricter than 
the current Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) flood-
plain regulations.128 As outlined in the CLIMB study, this “green” adap-
tation scenario would require flood-proofing all new development with-
in FEMA’s mapped one hundred- and five hundred-year floodplains.129 
The plan would require current residential structures within these 
floodplain zones to be flood-proofed upon resale.130 Further, develop-
ment within the one hundred-year floodplain must have living space 
elevated above the first floor.131 Outside the FEMA zone, developers 
must wet flood-proof buildings, allowing floodwaters to enter the home 
but preventing structural damage.132 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Haney et al., supra note 121, at 3; U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra 
note 6, at 309, 369; infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text (describing Private and 
Commonwealth Tidelands). 
124 See Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 59 (observing that 
maintenance of beach nourishment projects to prevent foreshore erosion and undercut-
ting can be high and necessary every five to ten years); U.S. Climate Change Sci. Pro-
gram, supra note 6, at 260–61, 290 (discussing the need for periodic renourishment). 
125 See U.S. Climate Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 318–19. 
126 See id. at 376. 
127 See Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 59. 
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 In addition to the “green” strategy outlined in the CLIMB study, 
the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Af-
fairs (“EEA”) has considered other accommodation strategies to deal 
with the effects of climate change.133 The EEA’s 2011 Climate Change 
Adaptation Report (“Adaptation Report”) recommends strategies to 
address vulnerabilities of commercial and residential developments, 
ports, and public infrastructure located within the Commonwealth’s 
coastal zone.134 The Adaptation Report recommends reducing con-
struction on vulnerable coastal areas.135 It also promotes consideration 
of a statewide “rolling easement” policy for existing development along 
the shoreline while preventing protection measures.136 
 Accommodation and resilience strategies could face legal con-
tests.137 The likely legality of some and illegality of other accommoda-
tion and resilience adaptation strategies are the primary subject of this 
Article’s review of existing laws—both common law and statutory-
based—and legal analysis.138 Specifically, this Article examines those 
strategies presently suggested by the EEA in its recently released Adap-
tation Report.139 
C. Mandatory Retreat and Relocation 
 Finally, communities can choose to avoid the impacts of acceler-
ated SLR on the coast through either the physical relocation of infra-
structure or its abandonment.140 Under retreat and relocation strate-
gies, decreased or moved development can lead to increased natural 
buffers against coastline changes.141 Typical retreat and relocation pro-
jects include relocating existing development out of floodplains, pro-
hibiting new buildings within floodplains and coastal areas identified to 
be at risk from increased coastal flooding, and prohibiting rebuilding 
of existing development after flooding occurs.142 A retreat policy likely 
                                                                                                                      
133 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 1. 
134 Id. at 108, 111–13. 
135 Id. at 111. 
136 Id. at 112. See infra notes 353–356 and accompanying text (discussing rolling ease-
ments). 
137 See infra notes 248–249 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 248–312 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 353–394 and accompanying text. 
140 Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 159; U.S. Climate 
Change Sci. Program, supra note 6, at 295. 
141 Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Report, supra note 108, at 159. 
142 Coastal Hazards Comm’n, supra note 11, at 3; Kirshen et al., CLIMB Final Re-
port, supra note 108, at 159. 
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would not set a damage threshold below which private landowners 
could repair coastal property, but instead would promote property 
abandonment.143 
 Despite the benefits of such strategies, property rights and land 
use will often make retreat strategies difficult to achieve.144 In the Unit-
ed States, and specifically within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
mandatory retreat and relocation adaptation strategies are very likely to 
trigger significant legal challenges.145 Given the state and federal juris-
prudence of the nature of private property rights, as further discussed 
and analyzed in this Article, landowners may challenge—and may even 
defeat—governmental actions intended to thwart existing land uses, 
activities, and coastal developments.146 
III. Relevant Massachusetts Statutes and Regulations 
A. Massachusetts Bay Colonial Ordinance of 1641–1647 
 Still recognized and repeatedly cited in waterfront property dis-
putes today, the legacy of the Massachusetts Bay Colonial Ordinance of 
1641–47 (“Colonial Ordinance” or “Ordinance”) plays an important 
role in shaping the legally complex landscape of public and private 
rights to, and ownership of, tidelands within the Commonwealth.147 
Originally found in the 1641 colonial Body of Libertyes, the Ordinance 
was first codified in the 1649 Book of General Lawes and Libertyes.148 
The Colonial Ordinance identifies and continues to inform the types of 
public and private uses allowed in so-called “Private Tidelands.”149 Jus-
tice Joseph Story prepared the 1814 edition of public laws, entitled 
                                                                                                                      
143 See Kirshen et al., Coastal Flooding, supra note 17, at 463. 
144 Id. at 467; see Titus, supra note 15, at 1286, 1318. 
145 See Titus, supra note 4, at 104; infra notes 248–312 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 18 (noting the tension that will arise between common 
law regarding erosion and private owners’ incentives to change it); Titus, supra note 15, at 
1326, 1334 (noting implications of tidelands regulations on the Takings Clause). 
147 63 Mass. Bay Colony, Gen. Lawes & Libertyes, Liberties Common (1641) (amended 
1647), reprinted in The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of 
the Massachusetts §§ 2–4 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., The Huntington Library 1975) (1648) 
[hereinafter Colonial Ordinance]; see also Arno v. Commonwealth, 931 N.E.2d 1, 18–19 
(Mass. 2010); 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02 (2012). 
148 Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Mass. 1979). 
149 See Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 18–19; Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 359. Reflect-
ing the Ordinance, the Massachusetts Code of Regulations defines Private Tidelands as 
lying “landward of the historic low water mark or of a line running 100 rods (1650 feet) 
seaward of the historic high water mark, whichever is farther landward.” 310 Mass. Code 
Regs. 9.02. 
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“Ancient Charters and Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachu-
setts Bay,” which contains the Colonial Ordinance in its final form.150 
 The Colonial Ordinance provides specific public rights in Private 
Tidelands and broad private rights of appropriation therein.151 For the 
public, the Colonial Ordinance establishes that “[e]very inhabitant who 
is an [sic] householder shall have free fishing and fowling in any great 
ponds, bays, coves and rivers . . . unless the freemen of the same town or 
the general court have otherwise appropriated them.”152 It also de-
clares: 
[I]n all creeks, coves, and other places about and upon salt 
water, where the sea ebbs and flows, the proprietor, or the 
land adjoining, shall have propriety to the low water mark, 
where the sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not 
more wheresoever it ebbs further: 
Provided, that such proprietor shall not by this liberty have 
power to stop or hinder the passage of boats or other vessels, 
in or through any sea, creeks or coves, to other men’s houses 
or lands.153 
From a plain reading of the text of this Ordinance, there is only one 
stated use restriction on lands appropriated by private landowners with-
in the tidal flats.154 Namely, the private landowner’s use must not un-
reasonably interfere with navigation.155 
                                                                                                                      
150 Moses M. Frankel, Law of Seashore Waters and Water Courses: Maine and 
Massachusetts 3 (1969). 
151 See Colonial Ordinance, supra note 147, §§ 2–4; 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02. 
152 Colonial Ordinance, supra note 147, § 2 (emphasis added). 
153 Id. § 3. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) observed in its 1974 
Opinion of the Justices (1974 Opinion), “[a]lthough strictly the ordinance was limited to 
the area of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, it has long been interpreted as effecting a grant 
of the tidal land to all coastal owners in the Commonwealth.” 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 
1974) (citing Weston v. Sampson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 347, 353–354 (1851)). The 1974 
Opinion continues: 
The language of the ordinance well illustrates the notion, previously alluded to, 
of reserved public right. It expressly specifies that the public is to retain the 
rights of fishing, fowling and navigation. Notwithstanding these limitations and 
the use of such ambiguous terms as “propriety” and “liberty,” there is ample ju-
dicial authority to the effect that the ordinance is properly construed as grant-
ing the benefitted owners a fee in the seashore to the extent described and sub-
ject to the public rights reserved. It is unnecessary to cite more than a few of the 
many cases to that effect. 
Id. 
154 See Colonial Ordinance, supra note 147, § 3. 
155 See id.; Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 13. 
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 Judges in Massachusetts have reviewed the rights in Private Tide-
lands granted to littoral landowners by the Colonial Ordinance for over 
two centuries.156 The Ordinance imposes a condition that construction 
between the mean high and historic mean low water marks cannot ma-
terially impair navigation by the public so as to constitute a public nui-
sance.157 From the Colonial Ordinance, a private littoral landowner 
gains a real or proprietary title to the soil of the tidelands itself and “as 
long as he does not unreasonably interfere with navigation,” can build 
in these flats so as to exclude the public.158 
 In its 1979 decision in Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Com-
monwealth, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) noted 
that “[n]ineteenth century opinions of the [SJC] construed th[e] colo-
nial ordinance as granting ‘only a qualified property’ in the flats to the 
upland owner, qualified by the public right of navigation.”159 Elaborat-
ing on and consistent with its opinion in the 1822 case Commonwealth v. 
Charlestown, the SJC found that the long-recognized ownership of land 
to the low water mark came with a condition.160 The SJC quoted its own 
language from the 1827 case Kean v. Stetson, stating, “‘[i]t is true indi-
viduals may acquire the right by grant or prescription, or under the or-
dinance of 1641, to occupy flats with wharves and stores, but this is al-
ways on condition that the navigation of the stream be not materially 
impaired.’”161 
 The SJC’s 1974 Opinion of the Justices (“1974 Opinion”) also pro-
vides insight on the extent of the private real property interests and ti-
tle that can be gained by private landowners versus public interests re-
served in Private Tidelands.162 Citing its prior case law, the SJC ob-
served that any private ownership below the mean high water mark, 
including “a real or proprietary title to, and interest in, the soil itself,” 
granted within tidal flats by the Colonial Ordinance, is “made perfect” 
except against public rights reserved for therein, specifically “fishing, 
                                                                                                                      
156 See, e.g., Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 13; Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 
180, 183–84 (1822). 
157 Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 183–84 (noting that an owner can build wharves 
so long as they do not interrupt navigation); see Colonial Ordinance, supra note 147, § 3. 
158 1974 Opinion, 313 N.E.2d at 566. 
159 Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 360. 
160 Id.; Charlestown, 18 Mass (1 Pick.) at 183–84. 
161 Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 360–61 (quoting Kean v. Stetson, 22 Mass. 
(5 Pick.) 492, 495 (1827) and citing several other SJC opinions from the 1800s and early 
1900s). 
162 1974 Opinion, 313 N.E.2d at 556. 
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fowling and navigation.”163 In this same 1974 Opinion, however, the 
SJC also noted that they “have frequently had occasion to declare the 
limited nature of public rights in the seashore. For example, a littoral 
owner may build on his tidal land so as to exclude the public com-
pletely as long as he does not unreasonably interfere with naviga-
tion.”164 They observed that cases “interpreting the right of the public 
in navigation all deal with the use in boats or other vessels of the area 
below mean high water mark when covered with tide water.”165 The SJC 
noted that although the reserved public right of fishing includes dig-
ging for clams in the flats, this right does not include the taking of “five 
cords of muscle mud” —which includes soil, clay, and shellfish, either 
living or dead.166 
 Importantly, the Justices were unable to identify any authority re-
lating to the rights of the public to walk on the beach or “to use other-
wise private beaches for public bathing.”167 In its analysis of the extent 
of public rights in Private Tidelands, the SJC commented that “[i]f a 
possessory interest in real property has any meaning at all it must in-
clude the general right to exclude others.”168 The SJC built on its 1974 
Opinion in a 1981 Opinion of the Justices (“1981 Opinion”). This 1981 
Opinion noted that “[i]t appears, therefore, that the public interest in 
flats reclaimed pursuant to lawful authority may be extinguished, and, 
if deemed appropriate, the Legislature may act to declare that those 
rights have been extinguished so as to assure the marketability of title 
to such property.”169 Thus, Massachusetts case law limits the public uses 
of Private Tidelands to those clearly related to fishing, fowling, and nav-
igation.170 
 Existing case law is less clear about potential limits of the private 
use of Private Tidelands to uses and activities related to navigation, fish-
ing, and other forms of maritime commerce. The 1974 and 1981 Opin-
ions neither identify additional limitations on the uses of Filled Tide-
lands nor discuss whether the uses located thereon must be specifically 
                                                                                                                      
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 183–
84). 
166 Id. at 567. 
167 Id. 
168 1974 Opinion, 313 N.E.2d at 568. 
169 Opinion of the Justices (1981 Opinion), 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099 (Mass. 1981). 
170 See 1981 Opinion, 424 N.E.2d at 1099; 1974 Opinion, 313 N.E.2d at 566. 
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navigation-related or water-dependent.171 To the contrary, in these two 
key opinions, the SJC noted that the Colonial Ordinance only limits 
private use within Private Tidelands to building on these tidal lands so 
as not to unreasonably interfere with navigation.172 However, in other 
historical and recent case law, the SJC at times has emphasized the pol-
icy behind the enactment of the Ordinance; namely, the need for pri-
vate investment in structures, such as wharves and piers, to encourage 
the development of colonial maritime commerce.173 
B. Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act of 1866 (Chapter 91) 
 Today, Chapter 91 of the Massachusetts General Laws (“MGL”) 
provides the “principal tool” for the protection, management, and pro-
motion of public use of tidelands and other waterways.174 The Public 
Waterfront Act of 1866 (“Chapter 91” or the “Act”) creates the Com-
monwealth’s tidelands and waterways licensing program.175 Originally 
                                                                                                                      
171 See 1981 Opinion, 424 N.E.2d at 1099 (discussing that an owner could fill tidelands 
without discussing future uses); 1974 Opinion, 313 N.E.2d at 568 (discussing the effects of a 
proposed bill on littoral property owners without discussing filled tidelands). 
172 See 1981 Opinion, 424 N.E.2d at 1099 (quoting 1974 Opinion, 313 N.E.2d at 566 and 
citing to several cases from the mid-1800s and early 1900s) (“A so-called ‘littoral owner 
may build on his tidal land so as to exclude the public completely as long as he does not 
unreasonably interfere with navigation.’”). 
173 See Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 359–60 (“As to the land between high and 
low water marks, however, commonly referred to as the flats, the Massachusetts colonial law 
and practice deviated from the English law. Chief Justice Parsons explained this legal devel-
opment very artfully in his opinion in Storer v. Freeman: ‘When our ancestors emigrated to this 
country, their first settlements were on harbors or arms of the sea; and commerce was among 
the earliest objects of their attention. For the purposes of commerce, wharves erected below 
high water mark were necessary. But the colony was not able to build them at the public ex-
pense. To induce persons to erect them, the common law of England was altered by an ordi-
nance, providing that the proprietor of land adjoining on the sea or salt water, shall hold to 
low water mark, where the tide does not ebb more than one hundred rods, but not more 
where the tide ebbs to a greater distance.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Storer v. Freeman, 6 
Mass. (6 Tyng.) 435, 437 (1810))); Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 183 (“The desire and 
necessity of wharves, quays or piers was soon felt by individuals and the community, and the 
occupation of flats became indispensable. The government then, to encourage these objects, 
and to prevent disputes and litigations, transferred its property in the shore of all creeks, 
coves, and other places upon the salt water, where the sea ebbs and flows, giving to the pro-
prietor of the land adjoining the property of the soil to low-water mark, where the sea does 
not ebb above one hundred rods.”); see also Trio Algarvio, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 795 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Mass. 2003) (citing Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d 
at 359–60, quoting Storer, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng.) at 437). 
174 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 91, § 1 (West 2012); Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Chap-
ter 91: The Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act 4 (2003), available at http://www. 
mass.gov/dep/water/resources/c91comp.pdf. 
175 Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 174. 
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enacted in 1866, the Act incorporated and built on the Colonial Ordi-
nance.176 The Act regulates activities on both coastal and inland water-
ways, including construction, dredging, and filling in of tidelands, cer-
tain rivers, and other waterbodies.177 
 The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
(“MassDEP” or “the Department”) administers the Act.178 Specifically, 
MassDEP has “charge of the lands, rights in lands, flats, shores and 
rights in tide waters belonging to the commonwealth.”179 To protect 
the interests of the Commonwealth in these areas, the Department has 
responsibility for reviewing and issuing licenses for structures and uses 
in tidelands, including Private Tidelands, to ensure they are retained 
“for water-dependent uses or otherwise serve a proper public pur-
pose.”180 To this end, MassDEP has promulgated its Waterways Regula-
tions to establish procedures, criteria, and standards for the uniform 
administration of provisions of Chapter 91.181 
                                                                                                                     
 The Act defines “tidelands” generally as both “present and former 
submerged lands and tidal flats lying below the mean high water 
mark.”182 Further, it defines “Private Tidelands” as those “tidelands held 
by a private party subject to an easement of the public for the purposes 
of navigation and free fishing and fowling and of passing freely over 
and through the water.”183 The Act also defines “Commonwealth Tide-
lands” as those “tidelands held by the commonwealth in trust for the 
benefit of the public or held by another party by license or grant of the 
commonwealth subject to an express or implied condition subsequent 
that it be used for a public purpose.”184 The Act defines “Water-
Dependent Uses” as “uses and facilities which require direct access to, 
or location in, marine or tidal waters,” and establishes the characteris-
tics for a “substantial structural change” or “change in use," requiring 
Chapter 91 review and licensing.185 
 MassDEP’s Waterways Regulations elaborate and expand on the 
Act’s statutory definitions. For Private Tidelands, the Department pre-
 
176 Id. 
177 Id at 3, 5–6; see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 91, § 14 (providing authority for licens-
ing of structures in, over, and under tide waters). 
178 Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 174, at 3. 
179 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 91, § 2. 
180 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 91, § 2 (West 2012). 
181 See 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.00–.55 (2012). 
182 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 91, § 1. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 See id. 
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sumes, “in accordance with the [Colonial Ordinance] . . . that tidelands 
are [P]rivate [T]idelands if they lie landward of the historic low water 
mark, or of a line running 100 rods (1650 feet) seaward of the historic 
high water mark, whichever is farther landward.”186 For Commonwealth 
Tidelands—also referred to in Massachusetts case law as Submerged 
Lands187—MassDEP “presume[s] that tidelands are Commonwealth 
[T]idelands if they lie seaward of the historic low water mark or of a line 
running 100 rods (1650 feet) seaward of the historic high water mark, 
whichever is farther landward.”188 MassDEP’s regulations provide meth-
ods for determining the historic high and low water marks, and further 
distinguish between “Flowed Tidelands” and “Filled Tidelands” —both 
generally subject to MassDEP’s jurisdiction and licensing requirements 
under Chapter 91.189 The former includes “present submerged lands 
and tidal flats which are subject to tidal action,” and the latter includes 
previously “submerged lands and tidal flats which are no longer subject 
to tidal action due to the presence of fill.”190 
 The Waterways Regulations also define “Water-Dependent Use” as 
a use that “requires direct access to or location in tidal or inland waters, 
and therefore cannot be located away from said waters.”191 Regulations 
require that nonwater-dependent use projects that include fill or struc-
tures within any tidelands subject to Chapter 91 jurisdiction do not 
“unreasonably diminish the capacity of such lands to accommodate wa-
ter-dependent use[s].”192 Such projects must not unreasonably inter-
fere with nearby water-dependent uses and related facilities.193 Under 
the Waterways Regulations, all licenses must state the term for which 
the license is effective.194 Although the maximum standard fixed term 
of a Chapter 91 license is thirty years, MassDEP has discretion to issue 
an extended license with up to a sixty-five year term for projects within 
Flowed Tidelands and a ninety-nine year term for any projects on Filled 
Tidelands.195 Upon its expiration, the license can be renewed for a sec-
ond term of the same length.196 
                                                                                                                      
186 See 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02. 
187 E.g., Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 14; 1981 Opinion, 424 N.E.2d at 1099. 
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 Furthermore, MassDEP defines “Beach Nourishment” as “the 
placement of clean sediment . . . on a beach to increase its width and 
volume for purposes of storm damage prevention, flood control, or 
public recreation.”197 It defines “Coastal or Shoreline Engineering 
Structure” as “any breakwater, bulkhead, groin, jetty, revetment, sea-
wall, weir, riprap or any other structure which by its design alters wave, 
tidal, current, ice, or sediment transport processes in order to protect 
inland or upland structures from the effects of such processes.”198 In its 
2007 Beach Nourishment Guide, MassDEP identifies both beach nour-
ishment and the utilization of dredged sediment for beach fill as Water-
Dependent activities under Chapter 91 and its Waterways Regula-
tions.199 Although MassDEP encourages use of non-structural beach 
nourishment to help prevent storm damage and control flooding, it 
notes that site-specific conditions and proximity to sensitive resources, 
such as salt marshes and shellfish beds, must also be considered to min-
imize environmental impacts and maximize protection of existing de-
velopment and infrastructure.200 Both the Act and regulations antici-
pate the need for soft and hard engineering to stabilize the shoreline 
from the effects of climate-change related sea level rise (“SLR”).201 
 Finally, for new buildings located within a flood zone and intended 
for human occupancy for nonwater-dependent uses,202 MassDEP’s Wa-
terways Regulations presently require that such buildings be designed 
and constructed to withstand wind and wave forces associated with a 
one hundred-year storm and incorporate projected SLR during the life 
of the building.203 In light of the projected climate change-related in-
creases in the frequency of today’s one hundred-year floods, conserva-
tively anticipated to occur every two to three years in the Boston 
area,204 present flood-design construction standards will need to be 
significantly updated to account for more frequent and severe coastal 
flooding, particularly for projects with extended term Chapter 91 li-
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censes.205 Further, the regulations only require new building designs to 
include SLR projections based on historical rates of increase in New 
England coastal areas.206 However, based on projections for signifi-
cantly accelerated SLR for the twenty-first century, scientifically ac-
cepted projections, not historical rates, should be used as the SLR base-
line for new construction design. 
                                                                                                                     
C. Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act of 2008 
 Signed into law in July 2008, the Massachusetts Global Warming 
Solutions Act (“GWSA”) represents “landmark climate legislation” 
adopted by the Massachusetts legislature.207 The GWSA, primarily codi-
fied in Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 21N, requires the Com-
monwealth to establish economy-wide greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emis-
sions reduction goals: by 2020, the state must achieve a 10–25% reduc-
tion below 1990 baseline levels, and by 2050, the reduction must be 80% 
below the 1990 baseline.208 Notably, the GWSA requires the Secretary of 
the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (“EEA”) to 
adopt a plan for achieving these reductions, determine whether compli-
ance with the established emissions limit is feasible, and oversee imple-
mentation of climate change-related regulations.209 It allows the Secre-
tary, in consultation with other state agencies, to consider the use of 
market mechanisms to address “climate change concerns.”210 The Act 
requires the Secretary to convene an advisory committee to oversee 
statewide GHG reduction measures, and a separate advisory committee 
to “analyze strategies for adapting to the predicted impacts of climate 
change in the commonwealth.”211 
 In April 2010, the MassDEP issued a Draft Climate Implementa-
tion Plan to serve as a framework for meeting the required 2020 and 
2050 emissions reduction goals of the GWSA.212 Thereafter, MassDEP 
held public hearings in June and received comments on its Draft Plan 
 
205 See 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.15. 
206 See id. at 9.37(2)(b)(2). 
207 Kimmell & Burt, supra note 11, at 302. 
208 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21N, §§ 3–4 (West 2012); see Overview of the Global Warm-
ing Solutions Act (GWSA), Mass. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/ 
climate/gwsa.htm (last visited May 7, 2013). 
209 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21N, §§ 4–5. 
210 Id. § 7. 
211 Id. § 8; 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. 583 (West). 
212 Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Draft Cli-
mate Implementation Plan 1 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/climate/ 
draftcip.pdf. 
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through July 2010.213 This Draft Plan included the Commonwealth’s 
strategies for meeting its statewide GHG reduction goals, and noted 
that the GWSA provides an avenue toward energy efficiency savings, 
energy independence, and new job creation.214 In its final question to 
be considered at public hearings, MassDEP addressed the Draft Plan’s 
linkage to adaptation planning.215 In addition, MassDEP noted that 
some GHG emissions reduction strategies also function as strategies for 
adapting to the “climate change that is unavoidable,” but did not ex-
pand on this statement or include any specific adaptation measures.216 
 The final Massachusetts Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020 
(“Climate Plan”), issued in December 2010, reviews climate change 
generally, its observed effects, and its potential impacts.217 The Climate 
Plan states that “Massachusetts is vulnerable to severe impacts from cli-
mate change.”218 The Climate Plan identifies impacts to coastal natural 
resources including: “[s]ubstantial increases in the extent and frequency 
of coastal flooding and increased risk of severe storm-related damage,” 
and “[p]ermanent inundation of low-lying coastal areas and increased 
shoreline erosion and wetland loss due to projected sea-level rise and 
increased wave action.”219 Despite addressing these issues, the Climate 
Plan’s “Integrated Portfolio of Policies,” its section on implementation, 
and its roadmap for “Policy Directions to be Developed in the Coming 
Years” do not explicitly address climate adaptation strategies.220 
 The majority of the GWSA’s text and the EEA’s related Climate 
Plan focus on GHG emissions reduction goals, plans, and potential im-
plementation strategies.221 As part of advisory committee input re-
quired by the GWSA, the EEA convened a Climate Change Adaptation 
Advisory Committee (“AAC”) in May 2009 to review and recommend 
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climate change adaptation strategies.222 The AAC held meetings and 
public information sessions in the summer of 2009 and presented an 
introduction to climate change science and the vulnerabilities of the 
coastal zone to climate change-related SLR to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in October 2009.223 Following extended internal state-level review 
of its original draft recommendations, the EEA submitted the AAC’s 
final report and recommendations, which include proposed adaptation 
strategies, to the Massachusetts legislature in September 2011.224 
 In consideration of the anticipated effects of climate change, the 
GWSA amended MGL Chapter 30, section 61, which codifies the Massa-
chusetts Environmental Protection Act.225 The GWSA inserted language 
requiring that, “[i]n considering and issuing permits, licenses and other 
administrative approvals and decisions, the respective agency, depart-
ment, board, commission or authority shall also consider reasonably 
foreseeable climate change impacts, including additional greenhouse gas 
emissions, and effects, such as predicted sea level rise.”226 Chapter 30 defines 
“Departments” broadly to include all of the Commonwealth’s depart-
ments and executive offices.227 Section 61 further requires a determina-
tion of environmental impacts and review of the use of “all practicable 
means and measures to minimize damage to the environment” by all 
state agencies and authorities.228 The statute also includes a presump-
tion—unless a clear contrary intent is manifested—that “all statutes shall 
be interpreted and administered so as to minimize and prevent damage 
to the environment.”229 Thus, while not yet integrated specifically into 
current state regulations or policies, this section of the GWSA may pro-
vide state agencies with authority to consider the effects of climate 
change, including accelerated SLR, in their review of uses and activities 
within Public and Private Tidelands, adjacent coastal areas, and related 
                                                                                                                      
222 Climate Change Adaptation Advisory Committee, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., http:// 
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license and permit conditions.230 However, such conditions, including 
those issued with Chapter 91 licenses, would likely lead to legal claims 
from coastal property owners, including those alleging unconstitutional 
takings by the Commonwealth of existing littoral property rights.231 
D. Massachusetts Climate Change Adaptation Report of 2011 
 In its 2011 Climate Change Adaptation Report (“the Adaptation 
Report”), the EEA found that “[c]limate change—with its resulting ac-
celeration of sea level rise, potential increased frequency and intensity 
of storms, and shifts in ocean temperature, currents and chemistry—is 
altering these already dynamic environments, exacerbating coastal 
management challenges.”232 In assessing the vulnerabilities of the 
Commonwealth’s coastal zone, the Adaptation Report observes that if 
“[u]naddressed, climate change will result in significant impacts to 
Massachusetts’ coast and ocean waters” and that “[i]mpacts could in-
clude loss of life; extensive property damage; destruction of public in-
frastructure; release of sewage, oil, debris, and other contaminants; and 
loss of commercial and marine-related businesses critical to local, re-
gional, and state economies.”233 The Adaptation Report recommends 
potential adaptation strategies to address climate change-related vul-
nerabilities of commercial and residential developments, ports, and 
public infrastructure located within the Commonwealth’s coastal 
zone.234 These adaptation strategies include discouraging development 
projects in vulnerable areas, such as those subject to storm surges and 
wind-driven waves, high erosion rates, and flooding.235 The Adaptation 
Report also recommends accounting for the movement of coastal re-
source areas, such as salt marshes and dunes, and their capacity to re-
spond to changing conditions.236 To mitigate the risk of repetitive 
losses from reoccurring storm damage to coastal properties, the EEA 
and AAC recommend commencing public discussion regarding how 
the Commonwealth should prioritize major public investments aimed 
at protecting existing development.237 The Adaptation Report observes 
that both public and private projects in large, populous, urban areas 
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will likely prioritize highly engineered structural protection meas-
ures.238 Conversely, the Adaptation Report also notes that some coastal 
areas may be able to reduce risks by implementing less engineered 
measures, such as Low Impact Development.239 
 The EEA’s Adaptation Report identifies regulatory and policy-
based tools to help achieve its recommended adaptation strategies.240 
The Adaptation Report encourages development of policy guidance to 
fully implement existing Chapter 91 regulations incorporating impacts 
of projected SLR “during the design life of buildings.”241 Further, the 
EEA and AAC recommend reviewing the Massachusetts Wetlands Pro-
tection Act’s rules and policies to identify possible revisions to address 
predicted changes in the location of coastal wetlands and resource ar-
eas.242 The Adaptation Report recommends reducing the number of 
vulnerable coastal properties via voluntary land acquisition, and poten-
tial adoption of a statewide “rolling easement” policy for existing shore-
line development, coupled with policies that prevent coastal armor-
ing.243 
 The Adaptation Report also recommends developing policies for 
new building design and construction in response to climate change.244 
The EEA and AAC promote adopting the “No Adverse Impact” ap-
proach—currently included in the Massachusetts Office of Coastal 
Zone Management’s StormSmart Coasts program—that recommends 
that construction projects avoid any adverse or cumulative impacts to 
nearby properties.245 In addition, the Adaptation Report recommends 
exploring the expansion of recent revisions to the State Building Code 
to increase requirements for storm-resistant building designs, materials, 
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and features.246 Further, regulators can account for projected rise in 
water table levels through revised septic system rules.247 
IV.  Legal Challenges to Climate Change Adaptation Strategies 
 Private property owners in Massachusetts and other coastal states 
have and will likely continue to challenge the constitutionality of both 
state and local laws impacting coastal land use. Laws restricting coastal 
development, limiting or conditioning permitted land uses along coast-
lines, or requiring increased conservation of undeveloped lands to ac-
commodate the landward migration of associated natural areas will 
likely encounter resistance from landowners. Impacting beaches, tidal 
flats, and coastal wetlands, laws attempting to address and mitigate the 
impacts of climate change—specifically sea level rise (“SLR”), coastal 
flooding, and increased coastal erosion—will necessarily impinge upon 
private property rights.248 The current takings jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(“SJC”) informs any application of the claims arising from increased 
coastal land use regulations imposed to increase social adaptation to 
the effects of climate change.249 
                                                                                                                     
A. Takings of All Economically Beneficial Uses 
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion provides that private property may not be taken for public use 
without just compensation.250 When determining the limited issue of 
whether all uses of a given parcel of property have been taken, courts 
follow the judicial precedent established by the Supreme Court in Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.251 Courts look to the “background 
principles” of state property law to determine if a governmental taking 
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of private property has occurred.252 In Lucas, the petitioner purchased 
two littoral lots on a barrier island where he intended to build resi-
dences.253 Two years later, the South Carolina legislature enacted the 
Beachfront Management Act, which established a new development 
setback from eroding coastal beaches.254 The law had the direct effect 
of barring Lucas from building permanent habitable structures on ei-
ther of his coastal properties.255 The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
concluded that Lucas was not entitled to compensation under the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the legislature passed the 
Act “‘to prevent serious public harm.’”256 
 The U.S. Supreme Court found that where state regulations “pro-
hibit all economically beneficial use of land,” such limitations “cannot 
be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere 
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner-
ship.”257 Further, the Court held that “a regulation that declares ‘off-
limits’ all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes be-
yond what the relevant background principles would dictate, [and] 
compensation must be paid to sustain it.”258 The Court remanded the 
case and emphasized that to win, the State had to do more than declare 
Lucas’s desired land use incompatible with the public interest or in vio-
lation of a common law principle.259 Instead, it needed to “identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the 
uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is 
presently found.”260 
 Almost a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed an 
asserted regulatory taking of all economically beneficial uses in Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island.261 The Court explained that to prove such a taking, 
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a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged regulation leaves “the 
property ‘economically idle’” and that the landowner retains less than 
“a token interest.”262 In Palazzolo, the petitioner owned a waterfront 
parcel, almost all of which was designated as coastal wetlands by state 
law when petitioner acquired title.263 When Rhode Island’s Coastal Re-
sources Council rejected his development proposals, Palazzolo sued, 
claiming that the state’s wetlands regulations constituted a taking un-
der the Fifth Amendment.264 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island re-
jected Palazzolo’s claim based on evidence of two hundred thousand 
dollars of remaining development value on an upland portion of the 
property, which contradicted his claimed deprivation of all beneficial 
use.265 Palazzolo had argued that the upland portion of his parcel was 
distinct from the wetlands portions.266 The Court, however, found that 
because Palazzolo initially alleged a taking of the entire parcel, the “to-
tal deprivation” of all economically beneficial uses argument failed.267 
 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed landowners’ challenges 
to state legislation affecting coastal land use in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.268 The Court 
unanimously affirmed the challenged Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
sion upholding the Florida Beach and Shore Preservation Act and its 
implementation through state-approved beach renourishment projects, 
holding the law did not contravene the plaintiffs’ established property 
rights.269 The plaintiffs, who owned beachfront property bordering a 
beach renourishment project, argued Florida invalidated their com-
mon-law right to have their properties touch the water.270 The Court 
found that the State had not taken the plaintiffs’ private property— 
specifically, littoral rights to future accretion, reliction, and contact of 
littoral property with the water—without just compensation in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.271 
In upholding the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, the Court held 
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that the Act was consistent with the background principles of Florida’s 
property law—specifically, its common law regarding the relative prior-
ity of private property owners’ littoral rights vis-à-vis the State’s existing 
rights to use its adjacent submerged lands and foreshore.272 
 Massachusetts’s public trust doctrine differs from the public trust 
approach in Florida. In Florida, the State owns the land permanently 
submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore in trust for the 
public.273 In Massachusetts, however, the adjacent littoral property 
owners typically own Private Tidelands, pursuant to the Massachusetts 
Bay Colonial Ordinance of 1641–47 (“Colonial Ordinance”) and the 
Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act of 1866 (“Chapter 91”).274 Under 
the Colonial Ordinance, a littoral property owner’s fee simple interest 
in these Private Tidelands has always been subject to an easement held 
by the Commonwealth for fishing, fowling, and navigation.275 
 Several centuries of state common law in Massachusetts have de-
fined the extent of and specific uses associated with public and private 
rights to these legally muddy Private Tidelands.276 Notably, a key restric-
tion in these tidal flats is that private uses cannot unreasonably inter-
fere with the public’s right of navigation so as to constitute a public nui-
sance.277 Further, under state common law, private fee simple owner-
ship of submerged lands—those lying seaward of the historic mean low 
water line, also referred to as Commonwealth or Public Tidelands—is 
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subject to a “condition subsequent” that these tidelands be used for the 
specific public purpose for which they were granted to the landowner 
by the Massachusetts legislature.278 
 Considering the centuries-old use restrictions placed on a littoral 
property owner’s fee simple title of Private Tidelands, this easement in 
favor of public uses for navigation, fishing, and fowling would likely be 
considered under Lucas to inhere in the title itself, and relate to back-
ground principles of Massachusetts’s property and nuisance law.279 
Thus, Massachusetts law could be interpreted expansively in its impacts 
on private land without implicating the Takings Clause.280 Laws and 
regulations related to the preservation or improvement of navigation 
and coastal resources in Private or Commonwealth Tidelands that pro-
vide critical habitat and breeding grounds for fish, birds, and other 
wildlife would support the activities protected by the public trust.281 
Even if such laws directly or indirectly deprived affected littoral owners 
of all economically beneficial uses in these areas or impaired their litto-
ral property rights, they would likely not be considered takings.282 Such 
                                                                                                                      
 
278 Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 17–18. As the SJC explained: 
[O]ur use of the terms ‘easement’ and ‘fee simple subject to a condition sub-
sequent’ should not, however, be interpreted as importing the manifold doc-
trines, limitations, and precedents that apply to those words in ordinary con-
texts where they are used to reflect bargains struck between or among private 
parties. Rather, in the case of tidelands, the terms serve, in essence, as place-
holders for historic public rights present in the jus publicum. 
Id. The SJC further explained that the term “easement” in the context of tidelands “repre-
sents the public rights in tidal flats reserved to the public by the Colonial Ordinance of 
1641–1647.” Id. at 18. 
279 See 505 U.S. at 1029. 
280 See id. 
281 See Colonial Ordinance, supra note 147, §§ 2–4. 
282 See Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909). In 
1909, in Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, the SJC acknowledged that the State held 
Public Tidelands, located below then tidally-influenced low water mark of the Charles 
River Basin, “both as owner of the fee and as the repository of sovereign power.” Id. at 125. 
The Commonwealth made changes to promote safer and more convenient navigation, and 
generally improve public health and comfort. Id. at 126, 129. These changes also had the 
consequence of impairing the use of adjacent littoral properties, including direct access to 
the water. Id. at 126. The SJC found, however, that the Commonwealth’s changes did not 
constitute a taking. Id. at 129. About fifty years later, the court revisited its holding in Home 
for Aged Women. See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass’n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 276 
(Mass. 1961). In Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass’n, the Commonwealth had at-
tempted to create a public beach by casting dredge materials along the shoreline of private 
littoral properties, thereby cutting off their exclusive access to the sea. Id. at 274. The SJC 
found that the Commonwealth’s power to control navigable tidal waters and tidelands “is 
not unlimited.” Id. at 276. Although its past cases, including Home for Aged Women, allowed 
the Commonwealth to exercise its specific powers to regulate and improve navigation and 
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reasoning would also apply to expanded resource buffers or future de-
velopment setbacks seaward of the mean high water mark within the 
area subject to easement, and which members of the public can exer-
cise their reserved use rights in Private Tidelands.283 Further, other use 
restrictions in tidelands, to allow for natural landward migration of 
coastal wetlands and other natural areas that support fish and wildlife, 
would also likely survive Lucas’s per se takings analysis because of the 
background principles of the Commonwealth’s established coastal 
property laws and public use doctrine.284 
 As most Private Tidelands are part of a larger parcel of littoral 
property that includes adjacent uplands, a court reviewing an alleged 
takings claim due to regulation of tideland areas would look to a peti-
tioner’s entire parcel to serve as the denominator for the takings 
claim.285 If regulations allowed for some economically beneficial use on 
upland portions of the littoral property—or more than a “token inter-
est” —the claim would likely fail as a “total deprivation” under Palaz-
zolo.286 If the state or affected municipalities wanted to avoid the crea-
tion of parcels existing solely of coastal wetlands or tidelands, they could 
enact subdivision control laws that prevent the creation of undevelop-
able coastal properties comprised solely of these protected natural re-
source areas. As noted in Palazzolo and by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 
takings jurisprudence, where landowner petitioners fail to establish a 
deprivation of all economically beneficial uses, these claims are exam-
ined under the Court’s traditional analysis for regulatory takings estab-
lished in the 1978 Supreme Court case Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City.287 In general, due to the background principles of state 
law inherent in littoral property rights and the typical combined compo-
sition of most littoral properties, the more flexible and regulation-
                                                                                                                      
er.” Id. 
fisheries, the SJC had never found that the Commonwealth had the power to build 
beaches for bathing purposes without compensating the affected littoral owners. Id. at 277. 
In Michaelson, the SJC found that a Commonwealth project is immune from private prop-
erty rights takings claims “only when it is so related to a project under the acknowledged 
public powers in the navigable waters (such as over navigation and the fisheries) that en-
joyment of the latter project would be substantially impaired without the creation of the 
form
283 See Home for Aged Women, 89 N.E. at 129. 
284 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Home for Aged Women, 89 N.E. at 129. 
285 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616; Public Rights Along the Shoreline, Mass. Office of Coastal 
Zone Mgmt., http://www.mass.gov/czm/shorelinepublicaccess.htm (last visited May 7, 
2013). 
286 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616, 631. 
287 See id. at 617; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); infra 
notes 292–295 and accompanying text. 
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friendly Penn Central analysis, rather than the strict per se Lucas regula-
tory takings test, will likely apply to most coastal property takings claims 
arising in Massachusetts. 
B. Takings Under the Penn Central Balancing Test 
 One year after its Palazzolo decision, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
viewed and decided Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency, in which the petitioners raised a regulatory tak-
ing claim following development restrictions imposed by a regional 
planning agency.288 In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court observed that “[t]he 
categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that compensation is 
required when a regulation deprives an owner of ‘all economically 
beneficial uses’ of his land.”289 The Court noted the Lucas test “was lim-
ited to the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or eco-
nomically beneficial use of land is permitted. . . . Anything less than a 
complete elimination of value, or a total loss . . . would require the kind 
of [takings] analysis applied in Penn Central.”290 In Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., the Court further reaffirmed the use of Penn Central “as the 
principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not 
fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.”291 
                                                                                                                     
 In Penn Central, the Court acknowledged that it had “been unable 
to develop any set formula for determining when justice and fairness 
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated 
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concen-
trated on a few persons.”292 Through its earlier ad hoc, factual inquir-
ies, the Court had identified several factors of particular significance.293 
Specifically, the Court considered: (1) “[t]he economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant;” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the 
 
288 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 
(2002). In Tahoe-Sierra, the regional planning agency had imposed two moratoria, totaling 
thirty-two months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a compre-
hensive land-use plan for the area. Id. Real estate owners, represented by an association, 
and individual owners, filed suits, later consolidated, which claimed the agency’s actions 
constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. See id. at 312–13. 
289 Id. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019). 
290 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
291 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
292 438 U.S. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
293 Id. 
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character of the governmental action.”294 The Penn Central Court also 
noted that it will uphold land use regulations when a state tribunal 
could reasonably conclude that the public’s “health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting particular contem-
plated uses of land,” even if the land use regulation “destroyed or ad-
versely affected recognized real property interests.”295 
  Land use laws and regulations likely to be enacted by the Com-
monwealth implementing climate change adaptation strategies would 
create new restrictions on the allowed use of coastal properties beyond 
those already existing within the fairly limited scope of the easement 
for public uses related to navigation, fishing, or fowling.296 As the Court 
noted in Penn Central, a takings review turns on a case-specific factual 
inquiry wherein the reviewing court would assess the economic impact 
of the regulation at issue on the claimant’s specific investment-backed 
expectations.297 
 Such a review would look to the amount that the claimant paid for 
the coastal property, the land use and development allowed on the 
property at the time of purchase, and the claimant’s reasonable expec-
tations regarding uses allowed by current or anticipated land use and 
zoning laws.298 Regulations requiring physical public access on and over 
the upland portion of littoral properties held in fee simple absolute 
would likely be considered a physical invasion, under the second prong 
of the Penn Central test regarding the character of government ac-
tion.299 Such regulations would require general rights of public ease-
ment across private uplands to the coast, and would thus be considered 
a taking.300 In contrast, land use laws reasonably related to protecting 
the public’s health, safety, and welfare in the face of reasonably pro-
jected SLR, increased coastal flooding and heightened storm surges 
would likely survive a takings analysis under the Penn Central balancing 
test.301 
                                                                                                                      
294 Id. In evaluating the character of the governmental action, the Court distinguished 
between physical invasions and where “interference arises from some public program ad-
justing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Id. 
295 Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he 
Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a 
regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate prop-
erty interests.”). 
296 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 3. 
297 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
298 See id. 
299 See id. 
300 See id. 
301 See id.; supra notes 240–247 and accompanying text. 
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 Approaching SLR through a statewide rolling easement policy for 
existing development along the shoreline, as discussed below, may 
prove more problematic.302 Such a program would require public ac-
cess across and over formerly unencumbered and already developed 
private uplands, and include policies to prevent armoring of eroding 
coastlines, specifically those adjacent to existing development on up-
lands or Filled Tidelands.303 Any related takings claims will likely be 
reviewed under Penn Central; although some cases may fall under the 
stricter Lucas and Palazzolo takings tests applicable in specific instances 
for a given land parcel.304 
 In 2005, the Massachusetts SJC addressed coastal floodplains re-
strictions in Gove v. Zoning Board of Appeals.305 The SJC examined the 
application of a municipal zoning ordinance prohibiting new residen-
tial dwellings to be constructed within a designated flood zone district 
and applied the “highly deferential” Penn Central takings test.306 Fur-
ther, the SJC looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Lingle decision, find-
ing the test “[i]n practical effect . . . renders a zoning ordinance valid 
under the [] Constitution unless its application bears no ‘reasonable 
relation to the State’s legitimate purpose.’”307 The SJC found that the 
evidence clearly established a reasonable relationship between the mu-
nicipal prohibition against residential development on the plaintiff’s 
undeveloped lot and legitimate state interests.308 In addition to evi-
dence of the potential danger a house on this coastal property would 
pose to local rescue workers, the court considered other evidence, in-
cluding expert testimony that a proposed house could be moved off its 
foundation by an especially severe storm, thus endangering or damag-
ing surrounding structures and property.309 
 The SJC in Gove also addressed plaintiff’s assertion of a total regula-
tory taking under Lucas and Palazzolo.310 Finding that the facts in Gove 
“are no more indicative of a total taking than those considered by the [] 
                                                                                                                      
302 See infra notes 353–394 and accompanying text. 
303 See U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 38, at 88; infra notes 353–
356 and accompanying text. 
304 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (noting that regulations denying all beneficial use im-
plicate Lucas whereas regulatory limits implicate Penn Central ). 
305 831 N.E.2d 865, 867 (Mass. 2005). 
306 Id. at 868–69, 873; Town of Chatham, Protective Bylaw § IV(A) (2012). 
307 Gove, 831 N.E.2d at 870 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 
125 (1978)); see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. 
308 Id. at 871. 
309 Id. at 871 & n.13. 
310 Id. at 872–73; see Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630–31; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026–32. 
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Supreme Court in Palazzolo” and that Gove had “failed to prove the chal-
lenged regulation left her property ‘economically idle,’” the court 
quickly dismissed the plaintiff’s contention.311 The SJC then evaluated 
Gove’s claim under the Penn Central balancing test. Under the first 
prong—evaluating claimant’s distinct investment-backed expectations— 
the court found that Gove did not sufficiently demonstrate her own fi-
nancial investment in the lot.312 The SJC emphasized “her inability to 
demonstrate that she ever had any reasonable expectation of selling that 
particular lot for residential development, or that she has suffered any 
substantial loss as a result of the regulations.”313 Rounding out its Penn 
Central analysis, the SJC noted “that ‘the character of the governmental 
action’” —enacting and enforcing the zoning ordinance—was “the type 
of limited protection against harmful private land use that routinely has 
withstood allegations of regulatory takings.”314 The SJC concluded that 
reasonable municipal action mitigating potential flood hazards, “at the 
very least when it does not involve a ‘total’ regulatory taking or a physi-
cal invasion, typically does not require compensation.”315 
C. Land Use Exactions Under Nollan-Dolan 
 Whereas the Penn Central test addresses regulatory takings, the va-
lidity of permit conditions fall under a different test.316 The U.S. Su-
preme Court’s so-called “Nollan-Dolan” two-step “essential nexus” and 
“rough proportionality” test provides a blueprint for landowners chal-
lenging the validity of conditions or requirements of applicable state 
environmental and land use permits.317 The test would apply to such 
varied instances as Chapter 91 licenses issued by Massachusetts De-
partment of Environmental Protection (“MassDEP”) and local permits 
issued by cities and municipalities, including land use, zoning, or build-
ing permits.318 
                                                                                                                      
311 Gove, 831 N.E.2d at 872. 
312 Id. at 873, 874–75 (discussing that Gove inherited the property). 
313 Id. at 875 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. For a detailed review of the No Adverse Impact floodplain planning and man-
agement strategies for flood-prone communities and an analysis of related Fifth Amend-
ment takings challenges, including the Gove case, see Thomas & Medlock, supra note 245, 
at 163–76. 
316 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
317 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388–91 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987); Titus, supra note 15, at 1339–42. 
318 See Titus, supra note 15, at 1339–42 
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 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, landowners in California 
challenged the State’s authority to create conditions for a permit for 
the plaintiffs’ rebuilding of their coastal residence.319 The California 
Coastal Commission had required that the owners dedicate a public 
access easement across their oceanfront property, due to its determina-
tion that the rebuilt home would block the public’s visual and psycho-
logical access to public beaches from the adjacent public roadway.320 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that for the permit condition not to con-
stitute an illegal taking of private property by the state government 
without just compensation, there must be an “essential nexus” between 
its legitimate state interests and the ends advanced as the justification 
for a given permit condition.321 
 The Court noted that if the Commission had attached to its permit 
a condition that protected the public’s ability to see the beach, despite 
the rebuilding of a larger residence, such as a building height or width 
restriction or a fence prohibition, “so long as the Commission could 
have exercised its police power . . . to forbid construction of the house 
altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.”322 
The Court also observed that a permit condition would be constitu-
tional even if it required that the plaintiffs provide a viewing spot on 
their property for those who would otherwise not be able to see the 
ocean because of their new house.323 Nevertheless, the Court found 
that the lack of a nexus between the permit condition and the original 
purpose of the Commission’s coastal “building restriction converts that 
purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then be-
comes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid 
governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.”324 In 
Nollan, the Court concluded that “[w]hatever may be the outer limits of 
‘legitimate state interests’ in the takings and land-use context, this is 
not one of them.”325 Further, the Court stated that the restriction 
would be “‘an out-and-out plan of extortion’” unless it served the same 
purpose as prohibiting development.326 
                                                                                                                      
319 483 U.S. at 827. 
320 Id. at 827, 835. 
321 Id. at 837. 
322 Id. at 836. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 837. 
325 483 U.S. at 837. 
326 Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)). 
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 The Court did not identify the “outer limits” of legitimate state 
interests in the takings and land use context.327 Seven years later, in its 
decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court held that prop-
erty use restrictions in a land use permit may constitute a taking if it is 
not reasonably necessary to effectuate a substantial government pur-
pose.328 Further, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires 
“rough proportionality” between the nature and extent of a use restric-
tion or requirement and the impact of proposed development.329 In 
Dolan, the City conditioned its approval of a permit to expand a com-
mercial building on the owner’s granting an easement on a portion of 
the property for a public greenway and the construction of a pedestrian 
pathway within an adjoining floodplain.330 The Court found that, al-
though reducing flooding and traffic congestion were legitimate public 
purposes, the City’s exactions far surpassed the need for flood mitiga-
tion.331 Further, and also unrelated to its interests of flood control, the 
Court viewed the dedication of land for a public greenway across pri-
vate property as extremely problematic because the public access re-
quirement struck at the core of the landowner’s property rights.332 Spe-
cifically, the Court identified a landowner’s right to exclude others as 
“‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property.’”333 
 The Court observed that the dedication of sidewalks and other 
public ways generally provided a reasonable means to avoid traffic con-
gestion.334 Despite this, the majority in Dolan found that the City had 
not met its burden of showing that the vehicle trips generated from the 
proposed commercial building expansion reasonably related to its re-
quirement of the dedication of a public pathway across the applicant 
owner’s property.335 Finally, although the Court noted as “laudable” the 
City’s goals of reducing flooding and vehicle congestion while provid-
ing public greenways, it noted that “there are outer limits to how this 
may be done.”336 Concluding its decision in a cautionary fashion, the 
Court stated that “‘[a] strong public desire to improve the public con-
                                                                                                                      
327 See id. 
328 512 U.S. at 388 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127). 
329 Id. at 391. 
330 Id. at 380. 
331 Id. at 396. 
332 Id. at 384. 
333 Id. at 384, 393 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
334 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395. 
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dition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change.’”337 
 The Court’s Nollan decision affects any property use limitations or 
affirmative requirements included in permits issued by the Common-
wealth, its cities, or municipalities.338 To satisfy the requirements of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the permits must have a clear link 
or “essential nexus” with the state’s legitimate interests—such as public 
protections against the reasonably anticipated effects of climate change 
along the state’s coastline, increased coastal flooding, and storm-related 
shoreline erosion.339 The substantial established body of scientific stud-
ies, observations, and related predictions of the global, and more local-
ized effects of climate change will likely only serve to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the state’s interests.340 Thus, this legitimacy can establish 
the required legal nexus under Nollan for related waterfront and land 
use restrictions or requirements attached to permits for future devel-
opment, redevelopment, or expansion of existing land use activities 
and uses of coastal properties.341 Whether the second part of the 
Court’s regulatory takings test, developed in Dolan, is also adequately 
met, will remain a much tougher question.342 Specifically, the state may 
have difficulty demonstrating the “rough proportionality” and reason-
                                                                                                                      
337 Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)) (alteration in origi-
nal). In a strong dissent in Dolan, Justices John Paul Stevens, Harry Blackmun, and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg made the following argument: 
In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize pre-
dictions about the impact of new urban developments on the risks of floods, 
earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental harms. When there is 
doubt concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the public interest in 
averting them must outweigh the private interest of the commercial entre-
preneur. If the government can demonstrate that the conditions it has im-
posed in a land use permit are rational, impartial and conducive to fulfilling 
the aims of a valid land use plan, a strong presumption of validity should at-
tach to those conditions. The burden of demonstrating that those conditions 
have unreasonably impaired the economic value of the proposed improve-
ment belongs squarely on the shoulders of the party challenging the state ac-
tion’s constitutionality. That allocation of burdens has served us well in the 
past. The Court has stumbled badly today by reversing it. 
Id. at 411 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
338 See 483 U.S. at 834. 
339 See id. at 837; EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 108. 
340 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 2; Byrne, su-
pra note 18, at 625–26. 
341 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra 
note 3. 
342 See 512 U.S. at 391. 
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able relation required between the nature and extent of a given coastal 
property use restriction or requirement and the anticipated impact of 
the proposed development or property use.343 
 Some adaptation strategies currently proposed by the Common-
wealth to address the impacts of climate change on development and 
land use along Massachusetts’s coastline will likely meet Dolan’s re-
quirements.344 Such adaptation strategies include: revising the State 
Building Code by strengthening requirements for storm-resistant build-
ing construction; enhancing separate septic system rules that account 
for projected rise in water table levels; and increasing local planning 
review to ensure that the design and construction of coastal develop-
ment projects do not have adverse impacts on surrounding proper-
ties.345 Such actions appear to have the direct relationship needed and 
be proportionately related to the effects of climate change, including 
SLR.346 
 For other more overarching actions the government’s burden will 
be much more substantial. For instance, it may be difficult to show a 
reasonable relationship and rough proportionally between a require-
ment for a landowner to maintain hard stabilization structures or im-
plement recommended soft stabilization techniques near eroding 
shorelines or floodplains.347 Particularly, the uncertainty in the speed 
and extent of predicted climate change-related accelerated SLR, in-
creased coastal flooding, and shoreline erosion provide the greatest 
obstacle to demonstrating the necessary relationship.348 
 Massachusetts’s existing public trust doctrine and its legal protec-
tion of use-specific public activities—such as those related to traditional 
fishing, fowling, and navigation—may allow a court to uphold permits 
requiring shoreline structures or land management practices within 
existing Commonwealth and Private Tidelands.349 In contrast, permit 
conditions affecting adjacent private uplands to protect currently up-
land areas for the future migration of tidelands, coastal natural re-
sources, and associated public uses will be considerably more difficult 
for state or local governments to argue persuasively for in court. As pri-
vate landowners may challenge sudden shifts in the location of private 
                                                                                                                      
343 See id.; Titus, supra note 15, at 1346. 
344 See 512 U.S. at 391; EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 110–13. 
345 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 110–13. 
346 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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and public property boundaries, courts could potentially extend the 
doctrine of avulsion to littoral properties.350 
 Finally, the right of private property owners to exclude others 
could provide an obstacle for the application of Massachusetts’s public 
trust doctrine to coastal areas affected by climate change. Recognized 
by the highest state and federal courts as one of the defining and core 
features of private property, the strong legal precedent establishing the 
property owner’s right to exclude physical access by the general public 
runs against any conditions imposed on that land.351 Thus, any permits 
requiring public access on or across private uplands located adjacent to 
the coastline, exacted with the goal of accommodating future public 
use rights along the coastline in anticipation of accelerated SLR, will 
likely prove difficult for the government to defend in the context of the 
regulatory takings precedent in Dolan.352 
D. Takings by Physical Invasion via Statewide “Rolling Easements” 
 One adaptation strategy recommended by the Massachusetts Ex-
ecutive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (“EEA”) and its Cli-
mate Change Adaptation Advisory Committee (“AAC”) in its final Adap-
tation Report addresses rolling easements.353 Under such a scheme, un-
burdened private uplands become subject to public use easements as 
sea levels rise.354 As noted in the report, “[t]hese rolling easements are 
typically coupled with policies that prevent armoring of the coast.”355 
Governmental agencies and academics have proposed and analyzed the 
legal viability of rolling easements as one of several options to ensure 
that human development and activities do not impede the natural in-
land migration of shorelines and coastal resource areas.356 
                                                                                                                      
 
350 See infra notes 382–386 and accompanying text. 
351 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176; Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 13; Severance v. Patterson 
(Severance I ), 370 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. 2012). 
352 See 512 U.S. at 388–91. 
353 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 112. 
354 U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 38, at 88; see EEA & Adapta-
tion Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 112. 
355 EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 112. 
356 See Titus, supra note 15, at 1308–09, 1308 n.117, 1309 n.119. Titus cites to reports, 
including by the U.S. EPA Office of Policy and Planning, dating back to the late 1980s, that 
provide an overview of approaches to preserve wetland shorelines in response to rising sea 
levels, including the creation of rolling easements. Id. at 1308 n.117. Over twenty years 
ago, Robert Fischman reviewed policy options for protecting wetlands susceptible to mi-
gration. Robert L. Fischman, Global Warming and Property Interests: Preserving Coastal Wet-
lands as Sea Levels Rise, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 565, 570–74 (1991). More recently, J. Peter 
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 Notably, Massachusetts’s existing property law and public trust 
doctrine differs from many other U.S. states, including Florida and 
Texas.357 Namely, the Commonwealth only owns “submerged lands” — 
seaward of the historic mean low water mark, instead of the mean high 
water mark.358 Thus in Massachusetts, unlike many other coastal U.S. 
states, the property line between state and private ownership of tide-
lands is not an ambulatory boundary associated with the mean high 
water mark, but has already been demarcated and fixed at the historic 
low water mark by the Colonial Ordinance and Chapter 91.359 
 Under its public trust doctrine, the Commonwealth has and con-
tinues to reserve an easement for specific public uses above the historic 
mean low water mark.360 Within undeveloped Flowed Tidelands, these 
public use rights and the public trust easement would clearly move 
landward when reliction or gradual shoreline erosion occurs, tracking 
the ambulatory mean high water line.361 Yet it is much less clear if this 
                                                                                                                      
 
Byrne discussed rolling easements in the context of Severance v. Patterson, discussed below. 
Byrne, supra note 18, at 630–31, infra notes 375–379 and accompanying text. 
357 Titus, supra note 15, at 1367 fig.11. 
358 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02 (2012); Titus, supra note 15, at 1366. 
359 See 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02; Tim Eichenberg, et al., Climate Change and the Public 
Trust Doctrine: Using an Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay, 3 
Golden Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 243, 263 (2010); Titus, supra note 15, at 1364–69. The federal 
Submerged Lands Act provides that states hold title to navigable waters, tidelands to mean 
high tide, and submerged lands to three miles offshore. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006). Massa-
chusetts is among five states—including Maine, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia—that 
has granted rights of private ownership to the mean low water mark. Eichenberg, et al., 
supra. For an illustrative map of varying public common law interests in tidelands and 
shores of coastal U.S. states, see Titus, supra note 15, at 1367. 
360 Colonial Ordinance, supra note 147, §§ 2–4; see 310 Mass. Code Regs. 9.02. In Arno 
v. Commonwealth, the SJC commented that its use of “easement” was simply a “place-
holder[] for historic public rights present in the jus publicum,” and does not “import[] 
the manifold doctrines, limitations, and precedents that apply to those words in ordinary 
contexts where they are used to reflect bargains struck between or among private parties.” 
931 N.E.2d at 17–18. 
361 The public trust easement would also move seaward when accretion occurs, as af-
fected landowners have the right to apportion the newly created uplands. See, e.g., Lorusso 
v. Acapesket Improvement Ass’n, 564 N.E.2d 360, 367 (Mass. 1990) (framing the “legal 
analysis by setting forth some well-established relevant principles having to do with the 
rights of littoral landowners. One of these is that, when the boundary between the water 
and the land changes by the gradual deposit of sand and clay and the like, then the line of 
ownership ordinarily follows the changing water line”) (internal citation omitted); Michael-
son, 173 N.E.2d at 275 (“If the beach had been created by accretion, which occurs [w]hen 
the line between water and land bordering thereon is changed by the gradual deposit of 
alluvial soil upon the margin of the water the answer would be clear; for [i]t is settled that 
where accretions are made to land along the seashore the line of ownership follows the 
changing water line.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Allen v. Wood, 152 N.E. 617, 
620 (Mass. 1926) (finding “[a]ccretions to land bounding on a river or the sea belong to 
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public trust easement would roll landward in the case of Filled Tide-
lands that have already been developed by private landowners within 
the scope of their existing property rights and the conditions of Chap-
ter 91 licenses.362 Further, it is also unclear if the easement would move 
if the present locations of coastlines and mean high water lines shift 
dramatically and abruptly landward because of climate-change related 
SLR, increased coastal flooding, or accelerated storm-related ero-
sion.363 Massachusetts case law does not typically distinguish between 
natural and man-made causes in determining whether a change in the 
mean high water mark affects a corresponding movement in the ambu-
latory line between Private Tidelands and adjacent private uplands.364 
However, it is legally debatable whether rapid and sudden coastline 
changes caused by climate change should be judicially reviewed under 
                                                                                                                      
the owners of the adjoining land” and that “[i]t is well established, in the case of accretions 
to land along the seashore, that ‘the line of ownership follows the changing water line’”) 
(quoting E. Bos. Co. v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 236, 238 (Mass. 1909)); Phillips v. Rhodes, 
48 Mass. (7 Met.) 322, 325 (Mass. 1843) (holding that defendant’s private easement to 
gather seaweed on the beach below a specific field existed “[w]herever the beach exists in 
front of or below the field, there the right of taking the sea dressing extends, and it mat-
ters not whether the sea has gained upon the land or has receded. The beach remains, and 
to that the easement is appurtenant”); Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. (3 Tyng.) 352, 362–
63 (Mass. 1807) (holding that increases to the flats are annexed to the adjoining upland, 
to the distance of one hundred rods from the shore, and benefit of the landowner, but 
specifically finding that, “[t]his increase is of necessity gradual and imperceptible. No man 
can fix a period when it began, no testimony can mark the exact margin of the channel on 
any given day or year. . . . [F]urther, we think this an instance in which we may safely apply 
the maxim, De minimis non curat lex [the law does not concern itself with trifles]”); Bergh v. 
Hines, 692 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (finding “well-settled authority for the 
proposition that littoral (shoreline) boundaries are not fixed, because natural processes of 
accr
1981 Opinion, 424 N.E.2d at 1103; 310 Mass. Code 
Reg
 See Bergh, 692 N.E.2d at 982 (discussing the “well-settled authority” that littoral 
bou
ory coastal boundaries—so long as the property owner did 
not 
etion or erosion change them, and that easements, stated to run with such a boundary, 
ordinarily will follow the naturally changing line”) (internal citation omitted). 
362 See Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 12–13; 
s. 9.15 (providing that permits for Filled Tidelands may be granted by the MassDEP 
for a term of up to ninety-nine years). 
363
ndaries changes as a result of natural and gradual processes); Sax, supra note 10, at 
343. 
364 See Lorusso, 654 N.E.2d at 367; Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 275; Adams, 3 Mass. (3 
Tyng.) at 362. It can be argued that accelerated SLR caused by climate change is man-
made instead of natural—but under existing Massachusetts case law, this distinction is not 
typically material as both natural forces and man-made activities may cause legally recog-
nized gradual shifts in ambulat
specifically create a change that benefits the land. See Lorusso, 654 N.E.2d at 367; 
Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 275. 
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th legal doctrines of accretion and reliction,e 
that the replacement of a common 
w 
als for the Fifth Cir-
cuit heard the case, but certified questions for the Texas Supreme 
     
365 or the doctrine of avul-
sion.366 
 A recent law review article by noted legal scholar and professor 
Joseph Sax concluded, after an extensive review of the ancient history 
of the legal doctrines of accretion and avulsion, that “[a]ny effort to 
characterize today’s rising sea levels as avulsive or accretive is empty of 
meaning.”367 The article proposes that title to littoral properties should 
“follow a moving water boundary without regard to the rate, percepti-
bility, or suddenness of the movement,” subject to only a handful of 
exceptions.368 Another legal scholar has recently argued that in the 
case of new legislative programs aimed at adapting to rising sea levels 
related to climate change, courts should not need to incorporate dated 
common law rules, which were developed under very different circum-
stances.369 Thus, the author argues “
la rule with a statutory one . . . should have no bearing on whether a 
regulatory taking has occurred.”370 
 In line with these academic proposals, Texas enacted legislation 
that can allow for rolling public beachfront easements. The law, how-
ever, has also faced legal challenges to the legislation.371 Texas courts 
had previously interpreted the Open Beaches Act to allow easements to 
shift with changes in coastline.372 Private landowners in Texas chal-
lenged the enforcement of such policies, raising constitutional claims 
in Severance v. Patterson.373 The U.S. Court of Appe
Court to resolve regarding its own property law.374 
                                                                                                                 
365 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. Under Massachusetts case law, these 
doctrines are premised on the occurrence of gradual and imperceptible shifts in ambula-
tory or moving location of riparian and coastal shorelines. See Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 
278
tory 
pro natural or man-induced events that cause sudden 
and anges. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 a new channel, when a 
mov d when the movement is transient. Id. at 353–54. 
8, at 638. 
 
. 
366 Sax, supra note 10, at 306–07; see Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 
25 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 19, 26–27 (2009). Under the doctrine of avulsion, ambula
perty lines do not shift after either 
 perceptible ch
367 Sax, supra note 10, at 355–56. 
368 Id. at 353. Sax’s exceptions include when a river shifts to
ement is caused by the owner, an
369 See Byrne, supra note 1
370 Id. at 639. 
371 See Open Beaches Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.011(a) (West 2011); Sever-
ance v. Patterson (Severance II ), 566 F.3d 790, 493 (5th Cir. 2009). 
372 Severance II, 566 F.3d at 493. 
373 Id. at 566 F.3d at 492. 
374 See id. at 503–04 (holding that plaintiff’s takings claim was not ripe, but certifying 
questions of state law to the Texas Supreme Court regarding whether Texas recognizes a 
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 In 2012, the Texas Supreme Court completed an extensive legal 
analysis of the law surrounding changing coastlines at the request of 
the Fifth Circuit.375 In Severance v. Patterson, the Texas court reviewed its 
state property law on the application of the accretion and reliction ver-
sus avulsion doctrines to determine whether Texas’s public beachfront 
easement—enforced by the state under the Texas Open Beaches Act—
“rolls” landward onto formerly dry land, requiring private owners to 
permit public access.376 Although several Justices dissented, the major-
ity of the Texas Supreme Court held that, as a matter of first impres-
sion, an avulsive event that suddenly moves the mean high tide line 
does not immediately deprive the landowner of the right to exclude 
others from the newly created beach.377 The court found that when 
sudden changes occur and materially alter the existing littoral bounda-
ries, the private land and the attached easement is lost to the public 
trust.378 Importantly, the Texas Supreme Court based its analysis in Sev-
erance I in that state’s own unique body of coastal property law.379 
 Similar cases that may arise under Massachusetts law should apply 
the general common law distinction between the doctrines of accretion 
and avulsion in determining whether ambulatory property boundaries 
and associated property rights should shift—in the case of accretion— 
or remain the same to comport with the law, as it has presently evolved, 
and its meaning as shaped by centuries of applicable case law in the 
case of avulsion. Such cases would decide whether the public easement 
                                                                                                                      
“rolling” public beachfront access easement). The court also certified a question of the 
extent to which a landowner would be entitled to compensation under Texas law or the 
U.S. Constitution for limitation on use of property effected by the landward migration of a 
d wet beach or completely 
subm  owner is not automatically deprived of her right 
to e
.3d at 707–08. 
tate-owned wet beach or completely submerged, the adjacent private prop-
erty utomatically deprived of her right to exclude the public from the new 
dry 
rolling easement to guide the federal court’s determination of plaintiff’s Fourth Amend-
ment unreasonable seizure claim. Id. The case went to the Texas Supreme Court in 2012. 
Severance I, 370 S.W.3d at 705. The court held that, as a matter of first impression, “if an 
avulsive event moves the mean high tide line and vegetation line suddenly and perceptibly, 
causing the former dry beach to become part of State-owne
erged, the adjacent private property
xclude the public from the new dry beach.” Id. at 723–24. 
375 Severance I, 370 S.W
376 Open Beaches Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.011(a) (West 2011); Severance I, 
370 S.W.3d at 724–25. 
377 Severance I, 370 S.W.3d at 723–24 (“If an avulsive event moves the mean high tide 
line and vegetation line suddenly and perceptibly, causing the former dry beach to be-
come part of S
 owner is not a
beach.”). 
378 Id. at 724. 
379 Id. at 708; see Severance II, 566 F.3d at 493. 
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can roll landward onto formerly unencumbered private uplands.380 In 
Massachusetts, littoral landowners’ rights related to accretion and relic-
tion are well-defined under existing state law, which is rich in meaning 
and legal application.381 To date, however, the SJC has only had the 





ly settled. That which is formed by gradual accre-
t 
ou
                                                                                                                     
rical review of riparian property boundaries.382 Specifically, 
, the SJC examined the issue of a non-tidally influenced ri
re parties disputed the location of riparian property boundaries.
graham v. Wilkinson, the SJC found: 
The doctrine of alluvion and its consequences seems to be 
very clear
tion, belongs to the owner of the soil to which it adheres. The 
land which may be separated from a man’s farm by a sudden 
change of the bed of the river may be reclaimed by him who 
lost it.384 
Climate change and associated SLR could offer an opportunity to re-
visit Ingraham. The increasing occurrence of events that precipitate sud-
den, violent, and perceptible changes in the Massachusetts coastline 
could cause an increase in related disputes regarding the relocation of 
littoral property interests and corresponding public use easements. I
w ld appear very timely for the SJC to extend its historical recognition 
of avulsion beyond the context of riparian property boundaries to re-
solve related issues regarding the location of ambulatory littoral 
boundaries that demarcate public trust and private property interests. 
 In Massachusetts, state and local legislative updates can and should 
be democratically enacted to proactively address the emerging public 
policy imperative for social adaptation to the effects of climate change. 
Yet the Commonwealth’s extensive body of coastal property law— in-
cluding its case law reviewing the location and extent of the easement 
for public trust rights, state statutes, and local zoning bylaws—is by no 
means currently empty or void of continued meaning.385 To the con-
 
48. 
, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 268, 273 (1826). 
s. Code Regs. 9.34 (2012) (discussing state and mu-
 
380 See Byrne, supra note 18, at 631; Christie, supra note 366, at 47–
381 See supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
382 See Ingraham v. Wilkinson
383 Id. at 269–70. The SJC defined the appropriate boundary as the filum aquce or mid-
dle of the river. Id. at 273 & n.2. 
384 Id. at 273. The term “alluvion” means “the wash or flow of water against the shore.” 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra note 7, at 31. 
385 See, e.g., Mass. Gen Laws §§ 29A, 30A (2010) (describing protections for private 
property along the shore); 310 Mas
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trary, Massachusetts’s existing property law remains of great signifi-
cance in any judicial determination of whether a claimed unconstitu-
tional taking by the government of private coastal property has oc-
curred by implementation of currently recommended climate change 
adaptation policies.386 State property law may be especially useful for 
any proposals seeking to enact a statewide rolling easements policy.387 
Existing laws should strongly influence the careful judicial balancing of 
competing factors under the Penn Central takings test, particularly in 
regard to the economic impact of a regulation on a specific land-
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations of the activities al-
lowed on their coastal property.388 Such laws should inform cases where 
significant private investments were made based on existing state laws 
and regulations. A court should look to whether the state acted within 
the scope of its specific powers related to navigation and fishing under 
the public trust doctrine or effected a physical invasion of private prop-
erty.389 Existing state property law should also direct any judicial de-
terminations that a governmental taking of all economically beneficial 
uses of a specific coastal property has occurred under the Lucas and 
Palazzolo takings tests.390 Given the significant, continued value and de-
rab
lopment.391 The increasingly 
roa
si ility of coastal lands to a variety of users, it is very likely that af-
fected parties will raise legal challenges to these changes, and Massa-
chusetts’s property law serves a means of resolving disputes among 
property owners. 
 Judicial review of the reasonableness of specific private investments 
in coastal properties can and should shift over time, depending in large 
part on the relative timing of enactments of legislation and related reg-
ulations for new coastal land uses and deve
b d social and political acknowledgement of climate change should 
also influence the determination of reasonableness. Particularly impor-
                                                                                                                      
nicipal zoning laws); Arno, 931 N.E.2d at 13–14 (discussing Massachusetts’s highly devel-
ope
rty law to determine whether 
rolli




d case law regarding tidelands). 
386 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612. 
387 See Severance I, 370 S.W.3d at 715 (using Texas prope
ng easements can be recognized under state law). 
388 See supra notes 288–315 and accompanying text. 
389 See Ling
.2d at 360. 
390 See supra notes 250–267 and accompanying text. 
391 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (
e of established state property law at the time a conflict begins). 
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tant factors include the foreseeable effects on the Massachusetts coast-
line and related natural resource areas.392 
 In the absence of new state statutes to the contrary, the common 
law distinction should be used as an equitable tool. In determining be-
sus on global warming 
and climate change has clearly solidified over the last decade.393 Fur-
ther,  the 
Commonwealth’s citi actment of the Mas-
d to 
 others, specifically those that require the 
b
tween gradual accretion and reliction versus abrupt avulsion—and their 
respective effects of shifting the location of public uses and associated 
access protected by the public trust doctrine—a court can determine 
which background property rights, conditions, and limitations affected 
landowners could have anticipated when investing in coastal property. 
Such an evaluation would differ from situations where unanticipated 
and sudden changes, including those caused by climate change, occur. 
 National and international scientific consen
social acknowledgement of this consensus by a majority of
zens, as symbolized by the en
sachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act of 2008, has only just oc-
curred within the last few years.394 Thus, the reasonableness of specific 
littoral landowners’ expectations in the use of affected coastal proper-
ties should be reviewed and judged accordingly. 
Conclusion: General Insights for Adaptation Efforts  
in Other Coastal Regions 
 In the United States, state and local governments will face many 
challenges in their development and implementation of successful and 
legally defensible laws, regulations, and land use strategies relate
climate change. Any actions in a state like Massachusetts that can effec-
tively and efficiently address the growing public policy imperative for 
proactive adaptation planning presented by the anticipated effects of 
climate change must address accelerated sea level rise, increased coastal 
flooding, and shoreline erosion. In addition, the Commonwealth’s pub-
lic trust doctrine and the U.S. Supreme Court’s federal takings jurispru-
dence both necessarily inform any actions Massachusetts may take. 
 Some strategies proposed by the Commonwealth’s Executive Of-
fice of Energy and Environmental Affairs for climate change adaptation 
in coastal areas would probably survive judicial scrutiny, if implemented 
and challenged. In contrast,
pu lic’s physical access to traditionally private properties, may not. 
                                                                                                                      
392 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 108. 
393 See id. at 12; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3. 
394 See EEA & Adaptation Advisory Comm., supra note 13, at 8, 23. 
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Most of the state’s existing coastal property law and legal doctrines like-
ly will prove inadequate over the course of the current century for re-
solving public versus private property ownership and use disputes. As 
unprecedented changes and shifts in local coastlines associated with 
and primarily caused by climate change occur, the current jurispru-
dence will prove ineffective. 
 Thus, as part of a public policy imperative, Massachusetts must 
adopt additional forward-looking state legislation, incorporating the 
reasonably anticipated effects of climate change on its regulation of 
traditional public and private property boundaries. Corresponding city 
and municipal ordinances and bylaws will also be needed to address 
these changes. These governmental actions must carefully navigate the 
constitutional limitations on the government’s taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation and equitably balance existing public 
and private interests in the state’s environmentally and economically 
valuable coastal properties. Such balancing of these often competing 
interests will certainly not be easy, but must occur. Individual landown-
ers and the general public will soon begin to directly experience and 
confront the many challenges presented by the effects of climate 
change, thus impacting traditionally accepted property boundaries and 
associated public and private uses and rights. 
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